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The Promise of a Cooperative and Proportional
Discovery Process in North Carolina: House Bill
380 and the New State Electronic Discovery
Rules
BRIAN C. VICK* AND NEIL C. MAGNUSON**
INTRODUCTION
With the passage of House Bill 380 (H.B. 380) in 2011,1 the North
Carolina General Assembly not only adopted a basic set of rules to govern the discovery of electronically-stored information (ESI) in the State
courts, but also created a procedural framework that set the State on a
path towards a more reasonable and efficient discovery process. North
Carolina has long adhered to the policy of allowing parties to conduct
the liberal discovery2 pioneered by the federal courts under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Although originally designed to promote the
* Brian C. Vick is a commercial and health care litigator at Williams Mullen and a member of the firm’s eDiscovery and Information Governance section. He is the co-chair of
the Technology Committee of the North Carolina Bar Association’s Litigation Section
and a former judicial law clerk on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit. The views expressed herein are solely those of the Author and
should not be attributed to his firm or its clients.
** Neil C. Magnuson is an intellectual property law associate at Williams Mullen, and a
member of the firm’s eDiscovery and Information Governance and Interactive Software
and Digital Media sections. The views expressed herein are solely those of the Author
and should not be attributed to his firm or its clients.
1. An Act to Clarify the Procedure for Discovery of Electronically Stored Information and to Make Conforming Changes to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 199 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 (2011)).
2. See Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 01 CVS 10614, 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at
*33 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (“Rule 26(b)(1) [of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure] makes clear that liberal discovery is permitted.”).
3. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 585 (2007) (“[T]he ‘simplified notice pleading standard’ of the Federal Rules ‘relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.’” (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002))); see
also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“‘[B]road discovery is a cornerstone of the litigation process contemplated by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.’” (quoting Jones v. Goord, No. 95 Civ. 8026 (GEL), 2002 U.S. Dist.
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swift and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes by providing parties
broad access to relevant facts,4 this policy has increasingly strained the
litigation process as its ideal of the liberal flow of information has
clashed with the practicalities of technological innovation in the field of
electronic discovery (e-discovery).5
Since the mid-1970s when a consumer market for personal computers first began developing,6 the use of computers and other electronic
devices has become a staple of modern life in the United States. As a result, the volume of data that we as a society create and store electronically has increased—and continues to increase—exponentially over even
relatively short periods of time.7 During one recent seven-year span, the
amount of data maintained on computers increased nearly two hundred

LEXIS 8707, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002))); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004) (“The provisions for discovery are so flexible and the provisions for pretrial procedure and summary judgment
so effective, that attempted surprise in federal practice is aborted very easily, synthetic
issues detected, and the gravamen of the dispute brought frankly into the open for the
inspection of the court.”).
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; O’Meara-Sterling v. Mitchell, 299 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir.
1962) (“The spirit and purpose of the Federal Rules is to secure just, speedy and inexpensive determination of actions and they look to the admission of matters about which
there is no dispute.”).
5. W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Mass. 2007) (“This
principle of liberal discovery is sorely tested when the object of the discovery is electronic data.”). See also Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392,
395 (D.S.C. 2004) (“[O]ne attorney [had] suggested to [the court] at a discovery hearing
that, including the request for electronic mail communications, a production request was
‘likely to exceed one million pages.’” (quoting Crane v. Int’l Paper Co., C/A No. 3:023352 (D.S.C. Apr. 25, 2003))).
6. See
A
History
of
IBM:
1975,
IBM,
http://www03.ibm.com/ibm/history/history/year_1975.html (last visited January 2, 2012) (noting
the introduction of the “IBM 5100 Portable Computer, a 50 lb. desktop machine that put
computer capabilities at the fingertips of engineers, analysts, statisticians, and other
problem-solvers”); A History of Windows: Highlights from the First 25 Years, WINDOWS,
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/windows/history (last visited January 2, 2012) (noting that Microsoft was founded in 1975 with the vision of placing “a computer on every
desktop and in every home”).
7. Data, Data Everywhere: A Special Report on Managing Information, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Data, Data Everywhere], available at
http://bistro.northwestern.edu/mmueller/datadeluge.pdf (indicating that “[t]he amount
of digital information increases tenfold every five years”).
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fold—from approximately 5 exabytes (or 5 million terabytes) of data in
2002 to 988 exabytes (or nearly 1 billion terabytes) of data in 2009.8
Although the shift towards storage of information in electronic form
represents nothing more than a change in the medium of storage, the intrinsic advantages of ESI9 outside of litigation often represent enormous
and costly disadvantages once the discovery of ESI in litigation begins.10
Indeed, given that the average desktop computer used by a company today is capable of storing in excess of 100 million pages of documents,
any company that becomes involved in litigation faces the possibility of
having to collect, process, search, and review many times that volume of
data in discovery.11 As the discovery of ESI has become a more prevalent
feature of civil litigation, parties have begun facing exorbitant litigation
expenses related solely to e-discovery.12
Responding to the burdens associated with e-discovery, the Rules
Committee of the Federal Judicial Conference (Federal Rules Commit8. Bennett B. Borden, The Demise of Linear Review, E-DISCOVERY ALERT, (Williams
Mullen, Richmond, VA.), Oct. 2010, at 1 [hereinafter The Demise of Linear Review],
available at http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discovery-blog/wp-content/uploads/
2010/12/E-Discovery_10-05-2010_Linear-Review_1.pdf; see also Jason R. Baron & Ralph
C. Losey, E-Discovery: Did You Know?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 11, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWbJWcsPp1M&feature=player_embedded.
9. See George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶¶ 8-10 (2007) (explaining that today information can
be exchanged, and edited faster, plus more information can be stored than in the past).
10. See Network Computing Servs., 223 F.R.D. at 395 (noting that a “request for electronic mail communications” could result in production in excess of “one million pages”).
11. See George Paul, The Discovery Revolution, THE PRACTICAL LITIGATOR, May 2007,
at 13, 15, available at http://www.lrlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Paul_Practical
Litigator_May07.pdf (estimating that an average corporate employee in 2005 had computer technology capable of storing between 20 million and 100 million pages of information).
12. See In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732-LDD, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 118226, at *26–27 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2011) (awarding aggregate e-discoveryrelated costs in excess of $500,000); Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.,
No. 2:07-CV-1294, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48847, at *8–9 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011) (noting that parties sought to recover e-discovery-related costs of nearly $400,000); Thermal
Design, Inc. v. Guardian Bldg. Prods., No. 08-C-828, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50108, at *3
(E.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2011) (indicating that a party could incur nearly $2.5 million in expenses for first round of e-discovery); CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, GUIDELINES FOR
STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY-STORED INFORMATION, at vi
(Richard Van Duizend, Reporter) (2006) [hereinafter CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES], available
at http://www.ncsconline.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf. (noting two prominent cases in which the e-discovery costs were estimated to be $6.2 million and $9.75
million).
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tee) proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
2006 (2006 Amendments) specifically designed to address the discovery
of ESI.13 The basic approach of these amendments was to create “a
framework for the parties and the court to give early attention to issues
relating to electronic discovery,”14 and to place the burden of managing
e-discovery squarely on the litigants.15 By expanding the scope and importance of the initial pre-trial conference under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16 and the discovery scheduling conference under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), the Rules Committee sought to foster
greater levels of engagement and cooperation between parties on issues
related to e-discovery.16 Combined with an expansion of principles of
proportionality in Rule 26(b), this new focus on collaboration in discovery has worked exceedingly well and has increased the efficiency of the
discovery process in the federal courts.17
While a number of states followed the federal judiciary in adopting
rules specifically designed to manage e-discovery,18 North Carolina
eschewed immediate action in favor of a more deliberative rule-making
process that sought to benefit from the experience of other jurisdictions.19 During this interim period, the State’s federal courts had access
to the 2006 Amendments,20 but the State trial courts had to grapple with
13. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at 22–23 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 COMM. REPORT], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf.
14. Id. at 26.
15. See id. at 27–32.
16. Id. at 26–28.
17. Emery G. Lee III & Kenneth J. Withers, Survey of United States Magistrate Judges
on the Effectiveness of the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 11
SEDONA CONF. J. 201, 207 (2010) (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magistrate judges reported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat effective in “improving the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences,” and that 70.5% reported it “as at
least somewhat effective in encouraging the parties to cooperate,” and finally that 61.1%
of magistrate judges reported it as at least somewhat effective in “reduc[ing] the number
of e-discovery disputes” the survey participants were asked to decide).
18. See THOMAS Y. ALLMAN, STATE AND FEDERAL E-DISCOVERY TODAY: AN UPDATE
AFTER THE 2006 FEDERAL AMENDMENTS, at 1–2, 56–69 (Nov. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.fiosinc.com/lp/whitepaper/state-rulemaking/state-rulemaking.pdf (detailing
the current status of state e-discovery rulemaking).
19. NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION LITIGATION SECTION E-DISCOVERY COMMITTEE,
PROPOSED AMENDED NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULES 16, 26, 33, 34, 37
AND 45, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT AND GENERAL COMMENTS: INTRODUCTION, at 1 (2010)
[hereinafter
E-DISCOVERY
COMM.
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.ncbar.org/media/11074033/NCROCPAmendEDiscovery.pdf.
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/2

4

VICK FINAL

3/23/2012 2:25 PM

Vick and Magnuson: The Promise of a Cooperative and Proportional Discovery Process i

2012]

NEW STATE ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY RULES

237

e-discovery using rules that either pre-dated the proliferation of ESI or
only provided informal guidance.21 This deliberative rule-making approach eventually resulted in passage of H.B. 380, which amended and
modernized the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure to create a generally-applicable framework for e-discovery for the State courts.22 Patterned after the 2006 Amendments, H.B. 380 reflects the same approach
to e-discovery and similarly attempts to reduce the associated burdens
by promoting greater levels of cooperation and proportionality in the
discovery process.23 Although the rule changes in H.B. 380 may seem
modest when compared to other recent reform efforts in the State,24
these amendments set the stage for a significant shift in how both courts
and litigants approach discovery in the State.
Using the experience of the federal courts under the 2006 Amendments as a guide, this Article examines H.B. 380 and the effect it will
have on the discovery process in the state courts. Part I of this Article
describes the litigation challenges created by the proliferation of ESI.
Part II describes the history, structure and substance of the 2006
Amendments, and discusses their impact in the areas of cooperation and
the use of proportionality principles in the federal courts. Part III describes the substance and structure of the rules changes encompassed by
H.B. 380, and analyzes the effect that they will have on the discovery
process in the State. Part IV discusses specific procedural tools that
practitioners and courts can use under the new e-discovery rules in
North Carolina to manage the exchange of ESI more efficiently.
I.

THE CHALLENGES OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY

The advent and rapid spread of ESI25 has profoundly affected the
civil litigation process due, in large part, to the simple truth that, in civil
21. See CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES, supra note 12, at vi–vii; see also Bank of Am. Corp.
v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *9–10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006)
(denying the electronic discovery request of a non-party as unduly burdensome after
considering, among other things, the guidelines set forth in the CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES,
supra note 12, at 1–11).
22. An Act to Clarify the Procedure for Discovery of Electronically Stored Information and to Make Conforming Changes to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 199 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 (2011)).
23. See E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 1–2.
24. See, e.g., An Act to Reform the Laws Relating to Money Judgment Appeal Bonds,
Bifurcation of Trials in Civil Cases, and Medical Liability, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 400
(enacted from 2011 Senate Bill 33).
25. See PETER LYMAN & HAL R. VARIAN, HOW MUCH INFORMATION 2003? 1 (Univ. of
Cal. at Berkley 2003), available at http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-
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discovery, volume drives cost.26 The more documents that a party must
collect, process, search, review, and produce in response to discovery,
the more that party will spend on the litigation and the more the opposing party will have to spend to organize, review, and manage the information.27 Although not directly proportional, discovery costs will generally rise (or fall) in relation to the volume of information at issue. As
ESI has become more ubiquitous in our daily lives, the volume of such
information at issue in civil discovery has rapidly increased, as have the
associated costs of managing such information.28
Prior to this proliferation of ESI, the physical aspects of storing information in paper form indirectly limited the volume of information at
issue in any given piece of litigation and, thus, the potential costs associated with discovery of that information.29 Much like the relationship
between volume and cost in discovery, the cost for a company to store
information on paper relates directly to the volume of paper required to
store the information, although, again, the two variables do not necessarily rise or fall in direct proportion to one another. For example, a company seeking to store 500 pages of paper documents would have to allo-

much-info-2003/printable_report.pdf (estimating that of the 5 exabytes of new information created by print, media, magnetic and optical storage media in 2002, up to 92% of
this information was stored in a magnetic format, mostly in hard disk).
26. See Kenneth J. Withers, The Real Cost of Virtual Discovery, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS,
Feb. 2001, at 3; see also 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22 (“The discovery of
electronically stored information raises markedly different issues from conventional discovery of paper records. Electronically stored information is characterized by exponentially greater volume than hard-copy documents.”).
27. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D.
Tenn. 2003) (“[T]he cost of restoring, de-duplicating, and designing and conducting a
search of all 996 backup tapes reasonably could be in the range of several million [dollars] . . . not includ[ing] the costs of privilege review and actual production . . . .”); JAMES
N. DERTOUZOS, ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY:
OPTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ix–xi (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice 2008), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP183.html; Jocelyn Allison, Temp Attorneys Boon for Some, Liability for Others, LAW 360 (May 14, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.law360.com/web/articles/101669 (noting that electronic discovery has raised
demand for lower-cost temporary attorneys due to an increase in the volume of documents and information that must be reviewed).
28. Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 67–68 (2007) (“[E]-discovery is more time-consuming, more
burdensome, and more costly than conventional discovery.”); see also Medtronic, 229
F.R.D. at 557–58 (estimating that privilege review of the ESI at issue would have cost
between $16.5 million and $70 million).
29. See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22–23; Noyes, supra note 28, at 67–
68.
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cate the physical volume of space that one ream of printer paper occupies, whereas a company seeking to store 500,000 pages of paper documents would have to allocate, at the very least, 1000 times as much
physical space and ensure that such space could handle the approximate
two-and-a-half tons that the paper would weigh.30 Put simply, the more
documents a company seeks to store in paper form, the more resources
it must allocate to the physical infrastructure necessary to house and
manage the documents. Although some companies stored large quantities of information prior to the advent of ESI,31 most did not allocate
their resources in this way and thus did not have to grapple with enormous repositories of potentially discoverable information when civil litigation arose.
With the advent of the electronic storage of information, the relationship between volume and cost in the storage of information—as well
as the cost of creating such information—fundamentally changed, leading to the rapid accretion of ESI throughout our society.32 The difference between the cost of storing 500 pages of information on a computer
hard drive and 500,000 or 5 million or 50 million pages is, at best, negligible in an environment where ordinary consumer hard drives that can
hold as much as two terabytes of data cost less than 150 dollars.33 If
used solely for storage purposes, a hard drive of this size could hold well
over 100 million pages of documents in a physical space smaller than a
single 500-sheet ream of paper.34 Accompanying this decrease in the
cost of storing information was the rapid spread of technologies, such as

30. See How Much Does 20-Pound Bond Paper Weigh?, HOW STUFF WORKS,
http://home.howstuffworks.com/question329.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) (“[A] 500sheet ream of 20-pound bond paper weighs 5 pounds.”).
31. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 546 n.103
(2003) (describing the production of millions of pages of paper documents in Castano
tobacco litigation); see also In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069,
1073 (3d Cir. 1980) (antitrust case involving millions of documents and over 100,000
pages of depositions); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 101 (W.D. Wash.
1976) (securities fraud case involving more than 900,000 documents).
32. See Data, Data Everywhere, supra note 7, at 1.
33. See, e.g., BEST BUY, http://www.bestbuy.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) (follow
“Products: Computers & Tablets: Hard Drives & Storage” hyperlink; then follow “Hard
Drives” hyperlink; then follow “2TB and Up” hyperlink) (listing nine 2 terabyte hard
drives for sale for less than $150).
34. See In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
118226, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2011) (noting that a party collected 1.05 terabytes of
data, which amounted to 75 million pages of information, and indicating that 2 terabytes
of data would amount to well over 100 million pages of information).
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personal computers and e-mail, that make creating, copying, and distributing ESI easier than ever, resulting in an exponential increase in the
amount of ESI that we, as a society, create and store.35
Not surprisingly, as the ubiquity of electronic data increased, ESI
began to appear more frequently as an issue in civil litigation.36 Although ESI represented nothing more than a new storage medium, its
appearance in civil litigation caused a broad range of problems and challenges, the most enduring and intractable of which relate directly to the
sheer volume of information that can come into play during discovery.37
For example, parties have long struggled with the issue of how to effectively preserve large quantities of ESI once litigation begins or is reasonably anticipated.38 However, from a financial and logistical perspective,
few issues have proven as difficult to surmount as how to manage discovery in an environment in which even a legitimate request for production can require a party to collect, process, search, review, and produce
ESI that is spread across thousands of potential repositories,39 and encompasses millions of pages of documents.40
35. See Paul & Baron, supra note 9, ¶ 9 (noting that “recently there has been an evolutionary burst in writing technology” that includes “digitization; real time computing;
the microprocessor; the personal computer, e-mail; local and wide-area networks leading
to the Internet; [and] . . . the World Wide Web”) (citations omitted); The Demise of Linear Review, supra note 8, at 1. See generally Baron & Losey, supra note 8.
36. See Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 794–95 (documenting the rise of e-discovery sanction cases
between 1996 and 2009).
37. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557–58 (W.D.
Tenn. 2003) (estimating that privilege review of ESI at issue would have cost between
$16.5 million and $70 million); 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22–23 (“Electronically stored information is characterized by exponentially greater volume than hardcopy documents.”); Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51
DUKE L.J. 561, 592 (2001) (“[E]lectronic discovery can be predicted, as a general matter,
to give rise to burdens and expense that are of a completely different magnitude from
those encountered in traditional discovery.”).
38. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(describing the loss of data resulting from failure to preserve records despite the existence of a corporate data retention policy).
39. Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *7–8 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (noting that a party’s original discovery request would have required recipient to identify, restore, extract, convert and process approximately 2500
backup tapes at a cost of over $1.5 million).
40. See In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732-LDD, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 118226, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2011) (noting that a party collected ESI
amounting to 75 million pages of information); Thermal Design, Inc. v. Guardian Bldg.
Prods., No. 08-C-828, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50108, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2011)
(noting that party produced 1.46 million pages of documents under ESI protocol); John
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Litigants have exacerbated the volume-cost challenges of ESI
through the increased use of discovery as an adversarial tool in civil litigation.41 Although originally intended to “secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding,”42 the liberal
discovery rules that are now commonplace throughout the United States
have struggled to live up to this ideal.43 Over time, and for reasons that
are beyond the scope of this article, litigants have used discovery as a
strategic opportunity to gain some type of advantage over their adversaries, rather than as a tool to ensure that disputes are resolved based on a
fair and complete understanding of the relevant facts.44 The result of
this adversarial approach is that, when parties engage in full-blown discovery, the associated costs amount to as much as 90% of the overall expenses incurred in the litigation.45
When combined with the volume of potentially discoverable ESI,
this adversarial approach to discovery has—in many instances—driven
the scope and cost of discovery beyond any reasonable bounds.46 For
example, in a case before the North Carolina Business Court, a party
served a Rule 45 subpoena on a third party that, if strictly enforced,
would have required the recipient to search for ESI across 2500 backup
B. v. Goetz, No. 3:98-0168, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8821, at *249 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 1,
2011) (discovery requests were estimated to require production of 15 million pages of
ESI at a cost of up to $10 million).
41. John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 551–52, 557–58, 571–72 (2010) (discussing abuse of the discovery process); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 17–19 (1984) (discussing abuse of the discovery process).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
43. See Beisner, supra note 41, at 584–97 (advocating for reform of the discovery
process in light of abuse of system).
44. Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C.
2004) (reflecting on what the court termed “[h]ardball discovery,” and noting that in order to gain an advantage “parties often overreach in their discovery requests and stonewall interrogatories from their opponents,” concluding that this state of affairs “is costly
to our system and consumes an inordinate amount of judicial resources” (citations omitted)).
45. Judicial Conference Adopts Rules Changes, Confronts Projected Budget Shortfalls,
THE THIRD BRANCH (U.S. Courts Office of Pub. Affairs, Washington, D.C.), October 1999,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/99-1001/Judicial_Conference_Adopts_Rules_Changes_Confronts_Projected_Budget_Shortfall.
aspx (“Discovery represents 50 percent of the litigation costs in the average case and up
to 90 percent of the litigation costs in cases in which it is actively used.”).
46. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557–58 (W.D.
Tenn. 2003) (estimating that a review of ESI requested in discovery would cost between
$16.5 million and $70 million).
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tapes at a cost of over $1.5 million, even though it had no formal role in
the litigation and, instead, was simply a repository of information of potential relevance to the dispute.47 In another case also involving a thirdparty subpoena, a government agency spent over $6 million (or approximately 9% of its annual budget) on e-discovery after the parties who
served the subpoena took advantage of the wording of a stipulated ESI
protocol to submit a list of 400 search terms that yielded 660,000 responsive documents.48 As these types of challenges first began emerging
in the mid-1990s, the federal judiciary took note and the Federal Rules
Committee launched an effort, discussed in the next section of this article, to examine and address the challenges of e-discovery.
II. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. The Introduction of Electronic Records into Federal Discovery
In 1970, the Federal Rules Committee revised Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “1970 Amendment”) to expand the definition of “documents” to “accord with changing technology,”49 and accommodate what turned out to be the extraordinarily understated view
“that the use of computerized information would increase.”50 Whereas
Rule 34 originally “focused on discovery of ‘documents’ and ‘things,’”51
the 1970 Amendment introduced “electronic data compilations from
which information can be obtained only with the use of detection devices” into the definition of “documents.” 52 The effect of such amendment

47. Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *7–8, *14–
16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006); see also Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 2,
Affidavit of Dennis Richter, Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS5564), available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=
3&caseNumber=05CVS5564; Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 3, Affidavit of Carl
Hardel, Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS-5564), available at
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber=0
5CVS5564.
48. In Re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (Subdivision (a) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 1970
amendments).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (Subdivision (a) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 2006
amendments).
51. Id.
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (Subdivision (a) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 1970
amendments).
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was to require a party to produce in “reasonably usable form”53 electronic
data that otherwise was “usable by the discovering party only through
[the producing party’s] devices.”54 Although this often meant supplying
a printout of computer data based on the technology available at the
time,55 the revised rule “did not preclude production of the information
in an electronic medium.”56 The fundamental effect of the 1970
Amendment was to expand discovery to include documents in electronic
or computerized form.57
The 1970 Amendment, however, did not provide adequate guidance
with respect to “when ‘data compilations’ or other types of electronic
documents have to be produced and in what form they should be produced.”58 In other words, while amended Rule 34 rendered certain electronic data the equivalent of “traditional paper documents,”59 doubt remained as to the precise reach of the rule.60 Courts, thus, had little
choice but to interpret and apply the Rules with respect to various forms

53. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A).
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (Subdivision (a) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 1970
amendments).
55. Id.
56. Nat’l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1262
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (citing 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2218 (2d ed. 1970)).
57. See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120 (LMM) (AJP),
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (stating “today it is black letter law that computerized data is discoverable if relevant”); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig,
995 F.2d 1376, 1382–83 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating “the Advisory Committee notes to the
1970 amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 make clear that computer data is
included in Rule 34’s description of documents”); Nat’l Union Elec. Corp., 494 F. Supp. at
1261–62 (indicating that computerized records are subject to requests for production
based on the 1970 amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 34).
58. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 649 (D. Kan. 2005).
59. The Sedona Principles: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing
Electronic Document Discovery, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP SERIES, (Sedona
Conference, Sedona, Ariz.) at iii (2005), http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/
miscFiles/7_05TSP.pdf [hereinafter The Sedona Principles].
60. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 650 (“[A]lthough Rule 34 was amended in 1970 to add
‘data compilations’ to the list of discoverable documents, there was no suggestion that
‘data compilations’ was intended to turn all forms of ‘data’ into a Rule 34 ‘document.’”
(citing The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at 37 cmt. 9.a)). In Williams, the District of
Kansas was faced with the question of whether “a court order directing a party to produce electronic documents as they are maintained in the ordinary course of business requires the producing party to produce those documents with the metadata intact.” Id. at
648. The court found that “neither Rule 34” as amended in 1970, “nor its advisory committee notes” provided a definitive answer to this question. Id. at 648–49.
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of electronic documents and data on an ad hoc basis.61 However, given
the vast categories of electronic documents and data that would soon
emerge (some very different in nature to traditional paper documents,
and many not contemplated or conceived of in 1970), such an ad hoc
approach was perhaps destined to cause uncertainty regarding the discovery of electronic records.
However, the uncertainty regarding the scope of Rule 34 after the
1970 Amendment was not the lone complicating factor for e-discovery.
As discussed above, volume is a transcendent issue with respect to the
discovery of ESI, particularly relative to paper records. As the Federal
Rules Committee observed, ESI “is characterized by exponentially greater volume than hard-copy documents,” in part due to the “capacity of
large organizations’ computer networks.” 62 Moreover, unlike paper
records, electronically stored information is not static; rather, such information is susceptible to proliferation, modification, or deletion, even
“without the operator’s specific direction or knowledge,” or by virtue of
seemingly innocuous actions, such as “merely turning a computer on or
off.”63 Finally, whereas paper records are by their nature self-revealing,
the substance or significance of ESI, in some cases, may not be learned
or understood apart from software or other electronic files on which the
information is dependent.64
Recognizing these idiosyncrasies and the issues that they create in
discovery, the Federal Rules Committee began in 1996 to review “the
experiences of the bar and bench” in order to determine whether the
changes in technology called for further rule making.65 The Committee
found not only a lack of uniformity in the courts’ treatment of ESI, but
also that the discovery of ESI was “becoming more time-consuming,
burdensome, and costly.”66 The Committee also found that the existing
61. See The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at 37 cmt. 9.a (considering what data
should be treated as discoverable “documents” and noting that “the evaluation of the
need for and relevance of such discovery should be separately analyzed on a case-by-case
basis” (citing Mcpeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001))).
62. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22–23 (noting that, at the time, such networks “store[d] information in terabytes, each of which represents the equivalent of 500
million typewritten pages of plain text, and [received] 250 to 300 million e-mail messages monthly”).
63. Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 23; see also Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9861, at *31–33 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2002) (discussing differences between paper-based
discovery and discovery of e-mail); The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at 3–6 (discussing the differences between electronic documents and paper documents).
65. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 23.
66. Id.
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discovery rules provided “inadequate guidance to litigants, judges, and
lawyers in determining discovery rights and obligations in particular
cases.”67 The Committee wrote:
Developing case law on discovery into electronically stored information
under the current rules is not consistent and is necessarily limited by the
specific facts involved. Disparate local rules have enlarged to fill this gap
between the existing discovery rules and practice, and more courts are
considering local rules. Without national rules adequate to address the
issues raised by electronic discovery, a patchwork of rules and requirements is likely to develop.68

As a result of this review process, the Federal Rules Committee
concluded that new rules were necessary to address the discovery of ESI
and that any such rules must be tailored to address concerns beyond
parties’ mere access to various forms and volumes of information. 69 Indeed, the Federal Rules Committee instructed that, ideally, any new
rules should seek “to reduce the costs of discovery, to increase its efficiency, to increase uniformity of practice, and to encourage the judiciary
to participate more actively in case management where appropriate.”70
After recognizing that “timely action” had to be taken “to make the federal discovery rules better able to accommodate the distinctive features of

67. Id.
68. Id.; see also id. at 24 (indicating that “[t]he costs of complying with unclear and
at times vague discovery obligations, which vary from district to district in ways unwarranted by local variations in practice, are becoming increasingly problematic”); Niemeyer
Memorandum, infra note 69, at 4 (noting that “the cost of discovery represents approximately 50% of the litigation costs in all cases, and as much as 90% of the litigation costs
in the cases where discovery is actively employed”). Compare Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (adopting a test designed
to determine whether to shift the costs of electronic discovery), with Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (modifying and replacing the
test announced in Rowe one year later with new multi-factor test).
69. See, e.g., Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil
Rules, to Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 3 (May
11, 1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/repcivil.pdf [hereinafter “Niemeyer Memorandum”] (noting that “for many years before [the commencement of the Committee’s discovery project in 1996], the Committee had received complaints from the bar and the public that discovery costs too much”); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 26. (Subdivision (f) of Advisory Committee’s notes on the 2006 Amendments) (noting
that inadvertent production of privileged information is a further concern due to the fact
that the sheer volume of data “may make privilege determinations more difficult, and
privilege review correspondingly more expensive and time consuming,” while at the
same time reducing the likelihood that parties will correctly identify privileged information).
70. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 24.
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electronic discovery,” the Committee further revised the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1999 to address the discovery of ESI. 71
B. The 2006 Amendments
In September 2005, the Federal Rules Committee delivered its Report of the Judicial Conference72—comprising its recommendations and
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules—to the Supreme Court for
consideration. On April 12, 2006, the United States Supreme Court approved the Committee’s proposed amendments,73 and with the tacit approval of Congress, the amendments went into effect on November 1,
2006.
The 2006 Amendments included revisions to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45, in large part addressing issues related to the discovery of electronically stored information.74 Specifically,
the Amendments were as follows:
Rule 16(b) was amended “to invite the court to address the disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information in the Rule 16
scheduling order.” 75 This amendment was one of several designed to
encourage “the handling of discovery of electronically stored information
early in the litigation, if such discovery is expected to occur.”76 Rule
16(b) was further amended to allow for judicial orders adopting any
agreements by the parties to protect as privileged any inadvertently produced trial-preparation material.77

71. Id.
72. Id. at 22 (noting that the report was a product of significant “time and energy”
contributed to by “bar organizations, attorneys, computer specialists, and members of the
public,” and further noting that “the committee’s study included several mini-conferences
and one major conference, bringing together lawyers, academics, judges, and litigants
with a variety of experiences and viewpoints”).
73. Letter from John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to
Dick
Cheney,
President,
U.S.
Senate
(Apr.
12,
2006),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf); Letter from John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker, House
of Representatives (Apr. 12, 2006), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/
frcv06p.pdf.
74. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22.
75. Id. at 26. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b).
76. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 26. The Committee noted that the
“amendments to Rule 16, Rule 26(a) and (f), and Form 35 present[ed] a framework for
the parties and the court to give early attention to issues relating to electronic discovery,
including the frequently-recurring problems of the preservation of evidence and the assertion of privilege and work-product protection.” Id.
77. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv).
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Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (formerly Rule 26(a)(1)(B)) was amended to
replace “data compilations” with “electronically stored information” as
information that a party must include in its initial disclosures.78
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) was amended to clarify that a party “need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the
party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or
cost,” provided that the party must, on motion to compel such information, show that the information is not reasonably accessible for these
reasons.79
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) was amended to provide a procedure whereby a
party that inadvertently produces work-product material may assert a
claim of privilege as to such material, thereby protecting it from further
disclosure.80 The Committee noted that this amendment was designed
to parallel those to Rules 16 and 26(f).81 The amended Rule further puts
a burden on the receiving party to “take reasonable steps to retrieve the
information,” even where the information was disclosed prior to its having been notified as to the claim of privilege.82
Rule 26(f) was amended to provide for discussion of “any issues relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information”
during the parties’ conference.83 As the Committee notes, the “topics to
be discussed include the form of producing electronically stored information, . . . preservation, . . . [and] whether they can agree on approaches to asserting claims of privilege or work-product protection after inadvertent production in discovery.”84
Rule 33(d) was amended to clarify that a party “may answer an interrogatory . . . by providing access to the [electronically stored] informa-

78. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 26 (noting that this amendment “makes
the rule consistent with disclosure practices in the courts and with the proposed electronic discovery amendment”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
80. Id.; 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 29.
81. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 29. The Committee further noted that:
Under the proposed amendments to Rules 26(f) and 16, if the parties are able
to reach an agreement to adopt protocols for asserting privilege and workproduct protection claims that will facilitate discovery that is faster and at a
lower cost, they may ask the court to include such arrangements in a casemanagement or other order.
Id. at 27.
82. Id. at 29.
83. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 26–27; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
84. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 26–27.
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tion if [the requesting] party can find the answer as readily as the responding party can.”85
Rule 34(a) was amended to “explicitly recognize [electronically
stored information] as a category subject to discovery . . . distinct from
‘documents’ and ‘things.’”86 In addition to addressing the uncertainty
surrounding the previously utilized term “data compilations,” the Committee noted that this amendment served to further distinguish “between
documents and electronically stored information, mak[ing] it clear that
there are differences between them important to managing discovery.”87
Rule 34(b) was amended to “authorize a requesting party to specify
the form of production, such as in paper or electronic form,” and to allow for “the responding party to object.”88
Rule 37(f) was amended to provide “limited protection against sanctions . . . for a party’s failure to provide electronically stored information
in discovery.”89 Specifically, “sanctions may not be imposed . . . if electronically stored information sought in discovery has been lost as a result of the routine operation of an electronic information system, as long
as that operation is in good faith.”90
Rule 45 was amended to conform “the provisions for subpoenas to
changes in other discovery rules related to discovery of electronically
stored information.”91

Collectively, the 2006 Amendments were designed to recognize and
respond to the conclusion reached by the Sedona Conference Working
Group that “dialogue between litigants is a prerequisite to resolving (or
avoiding) potentially costly and disruptive electronic discovery disputes.”92 Under the 2006 Amendments, parties are encouraged to communicate, and to get out in front of e-discovery issues, nearly at the onset of litigation. This may be achieved by: (1) collaborating to “identify
85. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 27; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d).
86. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 28; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
87. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 28.
88. Id. (noting that this amended rule “provides an electronic discovery analogue to
existing language that prevents massive ‘dumps’ of disorganized documents by requiring
production of documents as they are ordinarily maintained or labeled to correspond with
the categories in the request”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b).
89. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 33; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f).
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f).
91. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 28; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
92. The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at iv (noting further that “parties are wellserved by an early discussion about the issues in dispute, the types of information
sought, the likely sources and locations of such information, and the realistic costs of
identifying, locating, retrieving, reviewing, and producing such data”).
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the various sources of . . . information within [their] control that should
be searched for electronically stored information”;93 (2) discussing
“whether the information is reasonably accessible to the party that has it,
including the burden or cost of retrieving and reviewing the information”;94 and (3) discussing the “form or forms in which electronically
stored information might be produced,”95 along with “any issues regarding preservation of discoverable information.”96 This approach to promoting communication and cooperation has proven extremely effective
at addressing the challenges of e-discovery.97
C. The Impact of the 2006 Amendments
The 2006 Amendments have significantly impacted the management of e-discovery in the federal courts as a result of two central principles that the new rules emphasize: cooperation and proportionality. In
the years since their adoption, courts have actively embraced and promoted the idea that e-discovery should be a collaborative process that
strives to reach the information most relevant to any given dispute in as
efficient a manner as possible.98 Through application of the aspects of
the 2006 Amendments that promote cooperation between counsel and
proportional limitations on the scope of discovery, the federal courts
have made great strides in addressing the challenges of e-discovery, reducing the associated burdens on the parties, and decreasing the number
of discovery disputes presented to the courts for resolution.
i.

Cooperation under the 2006 Amendments

One of the central goals of the 2006 Amendments is to foster greater levels of cooperation between litigants in the discovery process and, in

93. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (Subdivision (b)(2) of Advisory Committee’s notes on
2006 Amendments).
94. Id.
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Subdivision (f) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 2006
Amendments).
96. Id.
97. See Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207 (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magistrate judges reported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat effective in “improving the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences,” and that 70.5% reported it “as at least somewhat effective in encouraging the parties to cooperate,” and
finally that 61.1% of magistrate judges reported it as at least somewhat effective in “reduc[ing] the number of e-discovery disputes” the survey participants were asked to decide).
98. See id.
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particular, with respect to e-discovery.99 The new rules do not go so far
as to require parties to compromise or impose explicit penalties on parties who fail to do so, but they do emphasize the importance of early
identification of e-discovery issues and the need for concerted efforts to
address such issues in discovery plans and scheduling orders.100 The
goal of this collaborative approach is to promote engagement between
the parties on issues where cooperative agreements can reduce the scope
of discovery and the likelihood of disputes erupting over ESI-related issues.101 This approach also facilitates early communication between the
parties so that, once discovery begins, the parties can proceed with a better sense of what lays ahead with respect to electronic discovery and
with a more unified understanding of what each party’s rights and obligations are in this regard.102
Recognizing the clear advantages of having parties take greater responsibility for the scope and contours of the discovery process, the federal judiciary has whole-heartedly embraced this collaborative approach,
with certain judges noting that “communication among counsel is crucial
to a successful electronic discovery process”103 and that “parties should
cooperate as much as possible[,] . . . for this collaboration helps . . . to
focus [discovery] on matters reasonably calculated to produce evidence
admissible at trial.”104 Indeed, as the 2006 Amendments have matured,
courts have increasingly framed cooperation as less of an aspirational
goal and more of a mandatory requirement,105 with at least one district
court adopting a local rule that explicitly requires counsel to cooperate
with one another in discovery.106
Parties have, in general, responded positively to this shift away from
a more adversarial paradigm in discovery. As a result, the federal courts

99. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Advisory Committee’s notes on 2006 Amendments).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (emphasis added).
104. Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Mass. 2009)
(citation omitted).
105. See Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01-cv-01644-REB-CBS, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17857, at *41 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010) (mandating that counsel cooperate in all aspects of discovery).
106. M.D.N.C. RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., R. 26.1(b)(1) (2011), available at
http://www.ncmd.uscourts.gov/CIV_LR.pdf (“The Court expects counsel to conduct discovery in good faith and to cooperate and be courteous with each other in all phases of
the discovery process.”).
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have seen an increase in collaborative agreements reached on a wide variety of electronic discovery-related issues. For example, in one matter,
the parties agreed to limit the scope of email production for the explicit
purpose of “streamlin[ing] the discovery process and reduc[ing] expenses.” 107 In another matter, the parties limited the scope and burdens
of e-discovery by agreeing that “the only relevant documents containing
electronically stored information” were emails, which “would be produced in PDF format.”108 Agreements such as these—addressing scope
and format—have become common in the wake of the 2006 Amendments and are designed specifically to reduce the cost of discovering
ESI.109 Even when parties have failed to reach agreement, the cooperative discussions in which they engaged have provided the court a solid
foundation on which to craft an ultimate resolution of the dispute.110
In order to reinforce the importance and significance of collaboration, courts have—by and large—held parties to ESI-related agreements,
even where doing so resulted in one party experiencing the very burdens
such agreements aim to reduce. For instance, courts have required parties to abide by agreements regarding the format in which they will produce ESI,111 and the search protocols that they will employ.112 In one

107. Widevine Techs., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc., No. 2-07-cv-321, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115264, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2009).
108. Palm Bay Int’l, Inc. v. Marchesi Di Barolo S.P.A., No. CV 09-601 (ADS) (AKT),
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104020, at *21 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2009) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
109. See, e.g., Kay Beer Distrib. v. Energy Brands, Inc., No. 07-C-1068, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 130595, at *17 (E.D. Wis. June 10, 2009) (noting that “the parties had agreed at
their Rule 26 conference that either a hard copy or electronic copy [of responsive documents] would be produced depending on what was most cost-effective”); Hassaine v.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 09CV2215-MMA (BGS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34117, at
*12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2011) (noting that “the parties agreed to produce any electronic
information in written format”); White v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 2:07-CV-216, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 112102, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 2008) (noting that “the parties agreed in
the Rule 26(f) Report to produce all documents on paper”).
110. See, e.g., Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103491, at *8–12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010) (crafting a phased ESI protocol that incorporated elements from the proposals that each party made when they were unable to
reach agreement on the scope of electronic discovery).
111. See, e.g., Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 09-CV-11783,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43753, at *12–13 (E.D. Mich. May 5, 2010) (ordering production
“in accordance with Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i),” which provides for production “in a form or
forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms”).
112. See, e.g., Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, 264 F.R.D. 541, 556–57 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(declining to permit discovery of expanded damages claims, given that the parties had, at
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notable example, a court enforced a stipulated ESI protocol that could be
read to allow one party to the agreement the unilateral discretion to designate the search terms that the other party would have to use when
searching for documents responsive to a Rule 45 subpoena.113 Even
though the agreement contained language suggesting that this discretion
was somewhat limited, the party who held the discretion exercised it in
an extraordinarily broad fashion to designate over 400 search terms.114
The court enforced the agreement as written, which resulted in the subpoena recipient incurring costs of over $6 million responding to the
subpoena.115 Courts have even shown the willingness to enforce informal agreements related to e-discovery where justified by the surrounding
circumstances.116
Consistent with the new focus on collaboration, courts are increasingly willing to step in and demand cooperation when parties submit
discovery disputes to the court for resolution.117 For example, in Mancia
v. Mayflower Textile Services Co.,118 Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm ordered the parties to meet and confer based on concerns about the
breadth of requested discovery in light of the modest amount at stake in
the litigation.119 In so doing, Judge Grimm noted that, had the parties
cooperated and communicated at the start of discovery, “most, if not all,
of [their discovery] disputes could have been resolved without involving
the outset of the case, agreed to direct search terms to a narrower set of damage theories).
113. In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. In re Classicstar Mare Lease Litig., No. 5:07-cv-353-JMH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9750, at *26 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2009) (enforcing an agreement to produce ESI in native
format based on an informal exchange between the parties); see also Oracle USA, Inc.,
264 F.R.D. at 556–57 (declining to permit discovery of expanded damages claims, given
that the parties had, at the outset of the case, agreed to direct search terms to a narrower
set of damage theories). But see Susquehanna Commer. Fin. v. Vascular Res., Inc., No.
1:09-CV-2012, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127125, at *5–6 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 1, 2010) (refusing
plaintiff’s request to enforce agreement reached with the defendants’ prior counsel, “particularly as some of the current defendants were not even named in the case when such
an agreement was reached, and particularly because plaintiff has failed to persuade the
Court that producing ESI and other data in native format will be unduly burdensome”).
117. See, e.g., Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. Grand Cent. Donuts, Inc.,
No. CV 2007-4027(ENV)(MDG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52261, at *14–15 (E.D.N.Y.
June 19, 2009) (directing parties to “meet and confer on developing a workable search
protocol” and noting that Rule 26(f) requires the parties to formulate a discovery plan
addressing such issues).
118. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008).
119. Id. at 364–65.
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the court.”120 Other courts have adopted a similar approach,121 with
some courts even citing the failure of the parties to cooperate early in the
litigation as the basis for denying discovery sought later in the same proceeding.122 Indeed, courts have shown no reticence in openly and vocally expressing their displeasure with parties who fail to communicate and
cooperate with one another on e-discovery issues.123
In a clear sign of the degree to which the federal judiciary has embraced cooperation as a means of streamlining the discovery process,
courts have increasingly looked to and relied on The Sedona Conference

120. Id. at 365.
121. See, e.g., Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Nos. 2:05-CV-0819,2:05-cv0848,2:05-CV-0879,2:05-CV-0893,2:05-CV-0913,2:05-CV-0959, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47620 (S.D. Ohio May 14, 2010) (instructing the parties to meet and confer regarding
search protocols as part of effort to locate certain of defendants’ documents); Burt Hill,
Inc. v. Hassan, No. 09-1285, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7492, at *34 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010)
(ordering the parties to “promptly meet and confer to determine whether the scope of
Defendants’ [overbroad discovery requests] can be narrowed, [and] whether they can
agree upon . . . ‘search terms’” to use in attempting to identify responsive documents);
Marion v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06cv969-LTS-RHW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27082, at *12 (S.D. Miss. March 17, 2008) (chastising parties for having “done little to
resolve their perceived differences on document production,” and demanding the “mutual cooperation of the parties” prospectively, and also threatening sanctions on “any
one—party or counsel or both—who engages in any conduct that causes unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation”).
122. See, e.g., Sentis Group, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 559 F.3d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 2009)
(noting the court’s belief that “neither party behaved in a manner consistent with the spirit of cooperation, openness, and candor owed to fellow litigants and the court and called
for in modern discovery”); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 3:07cv-449, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70514, at *8 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2009) (refusing to grant a
motion compelling additional discovery where the parties “could have avoided the expenses of [the] Motion by conferring appropriately early in the case about ESI”).
123. See, e.g., Seven Seas Cruises
v. V. Ships Leisure, No. 09-23411-CIVUNGARO/SIMONTON, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7063, at *18 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2011)
(concluding that “the ESI dispute in [the] case was primarily caused by the parties’ mutual failure to communicate and work together in a good faith effort to resolve the areas
of dispute”); Accounting Prin., Inc. v. Solomon Edwards Grp., LLC, No. 09-2085-CM,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82071, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2010) (decrying the lack of “meaningful discussion about the specific discovery requests at issue” and calling the dispute
“the litigation equivalent of the cafeteria food fight scene in the infamous movie Animal
House” before ordering a conference to discuss salient issues); Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Mp3tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (criticizing the parties for having
drafted “dueling epistles for submission to the court” rather than focusing “their attention
on discussing their differences”).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012

21

VICK FINAL

3/23/2012 2:25 PM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2

254

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:233

Cooperation Proclamation124 (Cooperation Proclamation), which carries no
precedential or persuasive authority, to define the obligations of counsel
in discovery. Issued after adoption of the 2006 Amendments and motivated by both “economy and logic,”125 the Cooperation Proclamation was
drafted as part of an effort “to promote open and forthright information
sharing, dialogue (internal and external), training, and the development
of practical tools to facilitate cooperative, collaborative, transparent discovery.”126 The Cooperation Proclamation identified specific methods
that litigants can use to facilitate cooperation and outlined a broad threestep process to integrate this new approach to discovery into the litigation process by (1) promoting greater awareness of the need for cooperation, (2) developing a full understanding of the changes needed to promote greater cooperation, and (3) developing practical “toolkits” to
support what the authors described as a “paradigm shift for the discovery
process.”127
Although only three pages in length, courts have repeatedly invoked the Cooperation Proclamation when reminding parties of their obligations to cooperate and communicate, and—in some cases—when
requiring such cooperation and communication. For example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania cited the Cooperation Proclamation when directing counsel “to work in a cooperative, rather than an adversarial
manner, to resolve discovery issues,” and stating its expectation that the
parties will “reach practical agreement” on e-discovery-related issues.128
Similarly, the Southern District of New York explicitly endorsed the Cooperation Proclamation when stating that “the best solution in the entire
area of electronic discovery is cooperation among counsel.”129 When
confronted with parties who had a “strained” relationship, the District of
Kansas “directed [the parties] to read” the Cooperation Proclamation in

124. Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING
GROUP SERIES: DIALOGUE DESIGNED TO MOVE THE LAW FORWARD IN A REASONED AND JUST
WAY, (Sedona Conference, Sedona, Ariz. 2008), http://www.thesedonaconference.org/
content/tsc_cooperation_proclamation/proclamation.pdf [hereinafter Cooperation Proclamation].
125. Id. at 1.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 3.
128. Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 124, at 1–3; SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D.
403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
129. William A. Gross Constr. Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134,
136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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order to “help [them] understand their obligations.”130 Numerous other
courts have similarly relied on the Cooperation Proclamation,131 indicating the level of importance that the federal judiciary has assigned to cooperative discovery in the wake of the 2006 Amendments.
This new focus on communication, cooperation, and collaboration
has been effective in addressing some of the challenges of e-discovery
and reducing the associated burdens. In a recent survey of federal magistrate judges, respondents reported that the 2006 Amendments had “encouraged more cooperation” and “reduced the number of e-discovery
disputes.”132 In large part, the willingness of the courts to enforce and
litigants to embrace this break from the traditional adversarial model of
discovery has driven these results.
While effective at addressing certain challenges of e-discovery, cooperation alone cannot eliminate every ESI-related issue from the discovery process. Even when parties succeed in reaching cooperative
agreements, disputes can still erupt over the very issues on which the
parties previously agreed.133 Thus, cooperation succeeds only to the ex130. Bldg. Erection Servs. Co. v. Am. Bldgs. Co., No. 09-2104-CM-DJW, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2625, at *4–5 (D. Kan. Jan. 13, 2010).
131. See, e.g., Susquehanna Commer. Fin., Inc. v. Vascular Res., Inc., No. 1:09-CV2012, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127125, at *40 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 1, 2010) (declaring that
courts generally refer to The Sedona Principles and other Sedona Conference publications
as “the leading authorities on electronic document retrieval and production”); DeGeer v.
Gillis, 755 F. Supp. 2d 909, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (endorsing the Cooperation Proclamation
and its “call for ‘cooperative, collaborative, [and] transparent discovery’”); Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. Grand Cent. Donuts, Inc., No. CV 20074027(ENV)(MDG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52261, at *14–15 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009)
(noting that the Cooperation Proclamation “recommends that parties cooperate to resolve
discovery disputes in order to reduce the rising costs associated with such disputes”);
Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props. Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 424–26 (D.N.J. 2009) (denying a motion to compel re-production of documents in native format, and citing numerous cases declaring the Sedona Conference publications to be “the leading authorities on
electronic document retrieval and production” while also admonishing the defendant to
address such issues early in litigation, through an “explicit agreement between the parties
as to production”).
132. See Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207 (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magistrate judges reported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat effective in “making the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences more effective,” 70.5%
reported it as at least somewhat effective in “encourage[ing] more cooperation,” and
61.1% reported it as at least somewhat effective in “reduc[ing] the number of e-discovery
disputes” decided by survey participants).
133. See In re Classicstar Mare Lease Litig., No. 5:07-cv-353-JMH, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9750, at *26 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2009) (enforcing parties’ agreement to produce ESI
in native format); Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, 264 F.R.D. 541, 556–57 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(declining to permit discovery of expanded damages claims, given that the parties had, at
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tent that parties are able to find and maintain common grounds on discovery issues. Once parties lose such footing, the benefits of cooperation fall away and the burdens of e-discovery return.134 However, principles of proportionality in discovery—which the 2006 Amendments
both incorporated and emphasized—help to fill in the gap left when cooperation fails,135 and more importantly, help prevent such gaps from
forming in the first instance.
ii.

Proportionality under the 2006 Amendments

As hard as it may be for younger lawyers to believe, the scope of
discovery allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was substantially broader in the past than it is today. Prior to 1983, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 placed no significant limitations on the scope
of discovery absent a protective order.136 In 1983, however, the Federal
Rules Committee substantially revised the rule “to deal with the problem
of over-discovery” and to “guard against redundant or disproportionate
discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of
inquiry.”137 The rule was expanded in 1993 out of recognition that—
even then—”[t]he information explosion of recent decades ha[d] greatly
increased both the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential for discovery to be used as an instrument for delay or oppression.”138
Today, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) presumptively allows a litigant to obtain discovery on “any nonprivileged matter that is
the outset of the case, agreed to direct search terms to a narrower set of damage theories).
134. See, e.g., McNulty v. Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 569, 571 (noting that
while both parties “claim[ed] the high ground on willingness to cooperate in electronic
discovery, . . . apparently no cooperation [had] occurred,” and the court was therefore
forced to order parties to meet and confer).
135. See, e.g., Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103491, at *8–12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010) (ordering discovery of the electronically
stored documents of three custodians from a proposed list of forty).
136. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Subdivision (a) of the Advisory Committee’s notes on
1983 amendments) (“The deletion of the last sentence of Rule 26(a)(1), which provided
that unless the court ordered otherwise under Rule 26(c) ‘the frequency of use’ of the
various discovery methods was not to be limited, is an attempt to address the problem of
duplicative, redundant, and excessive discovery and to reduce it.”).
137. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Subdivision (b) of the Advisory Committee’s note on 1983
amendments).
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Subdivision (b) of the Advisory Committee’s note on 1993
amendments).
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relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”139 However, as a result of the
1983 and 1993 amendments, Rule 26(b)(2) tempers the breadth of discovery through proportionality principles that allow a court to limit discovery to include only that information that is truly necessary and relevant to the resolution of a given dispute.140 Specifically, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) requires a court to
[L]imit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed . . . if it
determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or
can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the
information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action,
and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.141

The significance of this rule—particularly since the advent of electronic discovery—cannot be understated because it allows a court to
limit or prevent discovery based on its own subjective analysis of various
exigent circumstances surrounding the case.142 For example, a court can
preclude a party from requesting any further documents on a given subject if it determines that the party has—or should have—already obtained sufficient information on the subject in discovery.143 Similarly, a
court can limit a party’s document requests to a specific period of time
or specific individuals if it determines that a broader scope of discovery
would not serve “the needs of the case,”144 is not justified based on “the
amount in controversy,”145 or would not be appropriate given “the par-

139. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
140. Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 135 F.R.D. 101, 107 (D.N.J. 1990)
(recognizing that Rule 26(b)(2) “allow[s] the court to proportion discovery, even though
it may be relevant”).
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii) (requiring the court to limit discovery where “the
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information”).
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); see also Barrera v. Boughton, No.
3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at *8–12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010)
(limiting the time and scope of an initial ESI search).
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
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ties’ resources.”146 The fundamental power of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) lies in
the fact that it “allow[s] the court to proportion discovery, even though it
may be relevant” and would be discoverable notwithstanding the court’s
subjective analysis.147
Perhaps the only flaw in this proportionality framework is the fact
that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) places the onus of enforcement on the court without creating any new rights or obligations for litigants.148 This creates a
structural dynamic where discovery can be limited under this rule, but
where parties need not alter their discovery conduct until the court has
actively inserted itself into the process and imposed limitations. Historically, this fact limited the effectiveness of this rule because courts were
reluctant to exercise the full scope of their discretion under Rule
26(b)(2)(C).149 One likely explanation for this is that, in the prior age of
pure paper discovery, proportionality had less salience than today because the differing burdens associated with broad and narrow discovery
requests were generally not of a sufficient magnitude to spur action by
courts or litigants. A party may have grumbled over the expenses associated with searching for and producing marginally relevant paper documents, but the volume of such documents rarely escalated to the point
where discovery threatened to become “the sideshow which eclipse[d]

146. Id.
147. Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 135 F.R.D. 101, 107 (D.N.J. 1990)
(emphasis added); see also Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., No. 88-9752,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12959, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1991) (“Even were I to find some
remote relevance in the . . . [discovery] requests, the 1983 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules emphasized that discovery must be proportional, as well as relevant
to the lawsuit and must be tailored to the case at hand.”).
148. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Subdivision (b) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 1983
amendments) (“The new sentence is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive
in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse.” (emphasis added)).
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Subdivision (b)(1) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 2000
amendments) (“The Committee has been told repeatedly that courts have not implemented these limitations with the vigor that was contemplated.”). But see Leksi, Inc. v.
Fed. Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 99, 106 (D.N.J. 1989). A federal district court in New Jersey
cited Rule 26(b) to support a holding that:
The information which [the plaintiff] seeks . . . is disproportionate to the
declaratory judgment action it has filed. To compel the production of the [information would] . . . not only involve[] enormous inconvenience and management difficulties, but [would] also entail[] a frightening potential for
spawning unbearable side litigation which, in [the court’s] view, [would] defeat[] the purpose and spirit of the discovery rules themselves.
Id.
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the circus.”150 With the advent of e-discovery, this calculus fundamentally changed,151 and as a result, the concept of proportionality in discovery has taken on much greater importance.152
In 2006, the Federal Rules Committee amended Rule 26 to add subsection (b)(2)(B), which states that a party “need not provide discovery
of electronically stored information [that is] not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost” provided, however, that such party has
the burden of demonstrating that the ESI is, in fact, not reasonably accessible for these reasons.153 The new rule is specifically “designed to
address issues raised by difficulties in locating, retrieving, and providing
discovery of some electronically stored information,”154 and for the first
time, allows a party responding to discovery to proportion the scope of
its responses, at least in the first instance. This new rule rests on the
recognition that the burdens caused by the volume155 or geographic dispersion156 of ESI may, in many instances, be disproportionate to the value of that ESI to the litigation,157 and that, often, “information contained
on easily accessed sources . . . may be all that is reasonably useful or necessary for the litigation.”158
Although the Federal Rules Committee recognized the need to give
parties the ability to proportion the discovery of ESI, it also recognized
that granting such power carried a significant risk of abuse and, there150. Tech. Sales Assocs. v. Ohio Star Forge Co., Nos. 07-11745, 08-13365, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 53711, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 1, 2009).
151. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22–24.
152. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, No. 4:CV 03-49-BLW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
135726, at *14–15 (D. Idaho Dec. 22, 2010) (illustrating a court that weighed the burden of proposed discovery against its likely benefit, and exercising discretion under Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to deny a party’s motion to compel); Araiza v. Mecham, No. CV10-0188
PHX DGC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127420, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2010) (noting that
the court limited discovery as required by Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) “to ensure that it was
proportional to the modest amount at issue in [the] case”).
153. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (limiting Rule 26(b)(1)). Rule 26(b)(1) is further
limited by subsection (b)(2)(C), which, for instance, permits a court to limit discovery
where the burden of such discovery would outweigh its likely benefit. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
154. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (Subdivision (b)(2) of the advisory committee’s notes
on 2006 amendments).
155. See The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at 4 (sharing statistics concerning the
proliferation of electronically stored information).
156. Id. at 6, 17.
157. Id. at 17.
158. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 31 (noting that a “two-tier practice,” whereby the parties first examine easily-accessed sources before moving on to more difficultto-access sources, may be appropriate in some cases).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012

27

VICK FINAL

3/23/2012 2:25 PM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2

260

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:233

fore, took steps to mitigate this danger through the commentary to Rule
26(b)(2)(B).159 Prior to the 2006 Amendments, many litigants adopted
the practice of responding to electronic discovery requests simply by declining to produce ESI that was characterized as “difficult to access.”160
When expanding the role of proportionality under Rule 26(b)(2) in
2006, the Federal Rules Committee clarified that this new ability to limit
the scope of discovery on accessibility grounds only applied when ESI is
“difficult to access . . . for all purposes.”161 In other words, Rule
26(b)(2)(B) allows a party to proportion its production of ESI only when
the burden or cost of retrieval truly outweighs the value of the information to the litigation,162 and, even then, allows the opposing party to obtain the ESI when necessary. 163

Regarding the 2006 amendments, the Federal Rules Committee suggested:
Under this rule, a responding party should produce electronically stored information that is relevant, not privileged, and reasonably accessible, subject to
the (b)(2)(C) limitations that apply to all discovery. The responding party
must also identify, by category or type, the sources containing potentially responsive information that it is neither searching nor producing. The identification should, to the extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the requesting party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the discovery and the
likelihood of finding responsive information on the identified sources.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (Subdivision (b)(2) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 2006
amendments).
160. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 31.
161. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
162. Daniel B. Garrie, et al., Hiding the Inaccessible Truth: Amending the Federal Rules
to Accommodate Electronic Discovery, 25 REV. LITIG. 115, 118–19, 125, 126 (2006) (noting that Rule 26(b)(2)(B) does not allow litigants simply to “re-characterize their data by
saving it in inaccessible forms to eliminate discovery production obligations while maintaining access to their data”); see also Rebecca Rockwood, Comment, Shifting Burdens and
Concealing Electronic Evidence: Discovery in the Digital Era, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16, ¶ 34
(2006) (considering how Rule 26(b)(2)(B) and Rule 37(f) work together). Rockwood
observes that:
The combined effect of proposed Rules 26(b)(2)(B) and 37(f) is that companies can get the ‘benefits of a data deletion policy’ without actually deleting
anything. Although these new rules will help corporate defendants get through
the litigation process without incurring a great deal of expense, it will also allow them more room to conceal important files and electronic documents. In
the future, technically savvy defendants will have a distinct advantage in evading discovery of potentially damaging documents. In many cases, this could
change the entire outcome of the litigation.
Id.
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (Subdivision (b)(2) of Advisory Committee’s notes on
2006 amendments) (indicating that inaccessibility can be overcome by a showing of
good cause). The committee explained that:
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When analyzing accessibility objections under the 2006 Amendments, courts apply proportionality principles in a variety of ways to ensure that discovery “is reasonable and appropriate to the dispute at hand
while not imposing excessive burdens and costs on litigation and the
court.”164 In some cases, courts have denied a party’s request for ESI outright where the circumstances of the case did not justify the burden of
production or the party failed to show good cause.165 In other instances,
courts have substantially narrowed the scope of e-discovery to ensure
that the associated burdens corresponded to the facts of the case,166 in
some instances carefully distinguishing between accessible and inaccessible ESI sources.167 In still other matters, courts have used proportionality principles to limit the scope of proposed ESI protocols to specific cus[o]nce it is shown that a source of electronically stored information is not reasonably accessible, the requesting party may still obtain discovery by showing
good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) that balance the
costs and potential benefits of discovery. The decision whether to require a
responding party to search for and produce information that is not reasonably
accessible depends not only on the burdens and costs of doing so, but also on
whether those burdens and costs can be justified in the circumstances of the
case.
Id.
164. The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at iii. The Sedona Conference Working
Group has stated that, in “drafting the [Sedona] principles and commentary, [they] tried
to keep in mind the ‘rule of reasonableness,’” which is “embodied in [Federal] Rules 1
(courts should secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of all matters) and
26(b)(2) (proportionality test of burden, cost, and need).” Id.
165. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R.
2010) (denying a party’s request for three years’ worth of e-mails on the grounds that ESI
was “not reasonably accessible because of the undue burden and cost”); BBVA Compass
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Olson, No. 10-cv-00528-WYD-KLM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111633,
at *10 (D. Colo. Oct. 12, 2010) (finding that Plaintiff’s affidavit, which “attests that
Plaintiff [would] expend between 200 and 400 hours to compile the requested files” sufficiently demonstrated Plaintiff’s claim of undue burden, and finding Defendant’s need
insufficient to overcome such burden); Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01cv-01644-REB-CBS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17857, at *45–46 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010)
(calling the defendants’ argument the “e-discovery equivalent of an unsubstantiated claim
that the ‘sky is falling’”).
166. See, e.g., Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., No. 07-60077, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 111659, at *30–35 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2009) (ordering defendant to restore and
search one backup tape, rather than all of its backup tapes as plaintiff requested).
167. Johnson v. Neiman, No. 4:09CV00689 AGF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110496, at
*4–5 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2010) (holding that information stored on 5,880 backup tapes
was inaccessible based on estimated time and cost of restoring information); Helmert v.
Butterball, LLC, No. 4:08CV00342 JLH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60777, at *26 (E.D. Ark.
May 27, 2010) (allowing discovery of ESI housed on laptops and hard drives, but not ESI
located on backup tapes).
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todians,168 date ranges,169 and search terms most likely to yield relevant
information.170 More recently, courts have begun to show an increased
willingness to proportion e-discovery through iterative search and sampling techniques in which a small quantity of ESI is searched in order to
determine whether further and broader searches are justified.171
Similar to its reliance on the Cooperation Proclamation when addressing issues of cooperation under the 2006 Amendments, the federal
judiciary has begun to rely on The Sedona Conference’s Commentary on
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery172 (Commentary on Proportionality)
when addressing issues of proportionality. Issued in late 2010, the
Commentary on Proportionality sets forth and discusses six principles
“to guide courts, attorneys, and parties” when confronting questions regarding the proportionality of discovery.173 The six principles are:
1. The burdens and costs of preservation of potentially relevant information should be weighed against the potential value and uniqueness of
the information when determining the appropriate scope of preservation.

168. Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-500-BLW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121658, at
*8–9 (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2010) (characterizing a request for search of thirty custodians’
e-mails as “the proverbial fishing expedition” and, applying proportionality standards, to
limit the search to a single custodian).
169. United Cent. Bank v. Kanan Fashions, Inc., No. 10 C 331, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
83700, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2010) (adopting date ranges proposed by Plaintiff for
ESI search “given the cost of ESI and minimal relevance of any documents outside of
[the] date range”).
170. See, e.g., Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103491, at *12–13 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010) (rejecting a party’s proposed protocol that
sought search of ESI from forty custodians over six-year period in favor of limited protocol involving search of three custodians over three-year period); Edelen v. Campbell
Soup Co., 265 F.R.D. 676, 684–85 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (rejecting protocol proposed by a
requesting party that would have searched fifty-five custodians over a three-year period
using fifty search terms in favor of a narrower protocol proposed by the party responding
to discovery).
171. See, e.g., Barrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at *12; Phillip M. Adams & Assoc., LLC v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 1:05-CV-64, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45576, at *24–25 (D.
Utah May 10, 2010) (permitting a limited search of a sampling of Plaintiff’s old computers, with the possibility of “further discovery”); see also Makrakis v. DeMelis, No. 09-706C, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 223, at *6–7 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2010) (utilizing iterative searching under state procedural rules).
172. The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery,
CONF.
J.
289
(2010),
available
at
11
SEDONA
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/Proportionality2010.pdf [hereinafter Commentary on Proportionality].
173. Id. at 291.
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2. Discovery should generally be obtained from the most convenient,
least burdensome, and least expensive sources.
3. Undue burden, expense, or delay resulting from a party’s action or
inaction should be weighed against that party.
4. Extrinsic information and sampling may assist in the analysis of
whether requested discovery is sufficiently important to warrant the potential burden or expense of its production.
5. Nonmonetary factors should be considered when evaluating the burdens and benefits of discovery.
6. Technologies to reduce cost and burden should be considered in the
proportionality analysis.174

Within months of its initial publication, the Northern District of Illinois had cited the Commentary on Proportionality, informing parties—
who had been involved in litigation for six years, but were just reaching
the point of discovery—of its authority to limit discovery based on principles of proportionality in what appeared to be a clear attempt to steer
the parties away from misuse of the discovery process.175 More recently,
the District of Minnesota relied on the Commentary on Proportionality
when rejecting a party’s assertion that ESI was inaccessible and compelling that party to produce the ESI, in part, because “the burden and expense of this discovery was self-inflicted.”176 As with its frequent reliance on the Cooperation Proclamation, the federal judiciary’s growing
embrace of the Commentary on Proportionality reflects the extent to
which courts have come to recognize how they can use the proportionality principles in Rule 26(b) to shape and focus the process of electronic
discovery.
The power of these principles to reduce the burdens of electronic
discovery is manifest from the cases in which courts have actively ap-

174. Id.
175. Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at *7 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (“The ‘metrics’ set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) provide courts significant flexibility and discretion to assess the circumstances of the case and limit discovery
accordingly to ensure that the scope and duration of discovery is reasonably proportional
to the value of the requested information, the needs of the case, and the parties’ resources.” (quoting Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 172, at 294) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
176. Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., No. 09-2120 ADM/JSM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
122165, at *16–17 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2011) (“In assessing whether a particular discovery request or requirement is unduly burdensome or expensive, a court should consider
the extent to which the claimed burden expense grow[s] out of the responding party’s
action or inaction.” (citing the Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 172, at 294)).
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plied them. For example, in one recent case, the plaintiff sought production of ESI from forty custodians over a six year period using eighty
search terms.177 After considering the defendants’ objection that the cost
of such production would greatly outweigh its benefit to the case, the
court approved a limited initial sampling of ESI that only covered three
custodians over a three year period, but did employ the eighty search
terms proposed by the plaintiff.178 Although the defendant faced the
possibility of further e-discovery depending on the results of the initial
phase, the court’s willingness and ability to proportion discovery in this
manner reduced by 75% the defendants’ estimated costs associated with
the production.179
III. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. H.B. 380 and the Advent of Formal Electronic Discovery Rules in North
Carolina
Although state courts in North Carolina have confronted the same
e-discovery-related issues that prompted the Federal Rules Committee to
propose the 2006 Amendments,180 until passage of H.B. 380 in 2011, the
State lacked a set of generally-applicable procedural rules181 to govern
the discovery of ESI.182 As a result, state court litigants and judges have
had to grapple with the complexities of e-discovery under prior versions

177. Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at
*8–12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010).
178. Id.
179. See id. (noting that the estimated cost of full search was $60,000, while estimated
cost of limited search was between $13,000 and $15,000).
180. Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *7–10
(N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006).
181. See id. The North Carolina Business Court had adopted a limited set of rules related to e-discovery, but the Honorable Ben F. Tennille, Chief Special Superior Court
Judge for Complex Business Cases, recognized that development of a more comprehensive set of e-discovery rules would require legislative action. Id. at *9–10.
182. Id. (“Were it necessary to adopt a separate test specifically for electronic discovery, it would not be the province of this Court to do so. It is for the appellate courts and
the Legislature to set forth such a test.”); Kara A. Millonzi, E-Discovery In North Carolina:
A Review of the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 2008 Proposed Amendments to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 2 (draft) (March 26,
2009) available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/programs/attorneyconferences/
docs/2009-city%20winter-millonzi-ediscovery%20memo.pdf.
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of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure183 and informal guidelines promulgated by the Conference of Chief Justices.184 During this
time, e-discovery issues arose,185 but the State courts did not experience
any ESI-related scenarios of a magnitude similar to those confronted by
the federal courts prior to the adoption of the 2006 Amendments.186
Regardless, based on the changes that had taken place on the federal
level, the North Carolina Bar Association’s Litigation Section formed an
E-Discovery Committee during its 2007–2008 term to study the issue
and examine possible changes to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.187 The E-Discovery Committee was specifically tasked with proposing “a mechanism for discovery of ESI during litigation in our state
courts” and a “means to alleviate, to the extent possible, the difficulties
demonstrated in the early interpretations of the [2006 Amendments].”188
Accordingly, the committee eventually proposed a discrete set of
amendments to North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 16, 26, 33, 34,
37, and 45.189 Eschewing a more complicated or novel scheme, the EDiscovery Committee followed the federal approach and largely patterned the rule changes in H.B. 380 after the 2006 Amendments with only a handful of state-specific alterations.190
Perhaps most significantly, the E-Discovery Committee emphasized
the fact that “practical application of the federal rules amendments [had
shown] the great value of pre-discovery dialogue among the parties or

183. Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 01 CVS 10614, 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at *39–
41 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (analyzing a claim that production of electronic information poses an undue burden on a party under Rule 26(b)(2) proportionality factors).
184. Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *9–10 (denying electronic discovery
request of a non-party as unduly burdensome after considering, among other things, the
factors set forth in the Conference of Chief Justices, Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery of Electronically-Stored Information); see also CONF. OF CHIEF
JUSTICES, supra note 12.
185. See generally Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *9–10; Analog Devices,
Inc., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16.
186. See generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
187. NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION LITIGATION SECTION E-DISCOVERY COMMITTEE,
PROPOSED AMENDED NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULES 16, 26, 33, 34, 37
AND 45: OVERVIEW 1 (2010), [hereinafter “E-DISCOVERY COMM. OVERVIEW”] available at
http://www.ncbar.org/media/11074033/NCROCPAmendEDiscovery.pdf .
188. E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 1–2.
189. E-DISCOVERY COMM. OVERVIEW, supra note 187, at 1–2.
190. See E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that the proposed
rules “follow[] the concepts of the federal rules”).
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their attorneys, particularly with regard to discovery of ESI.”191 As a result, the committee specifically designed the new rules to “encourage
and facilitate that dialogue[] to the greatest extent possible short of
mandating a conference in every civil matter,” and to “create a framework for the court and the litigants to [use in] address[ing] the methods,
mechanisms, and potential costs of discovery of ESI.”192 The specific
rule changes that make up this framework are described below.193
• Rule 16—Court-Ordered Discovery Scheduling Conference
As part of an overall scheme to bring greater control to the discovery process, H.B. 380 amended Rule 16 to increase the effectiveness of
court-ordered pre-trial scheduling conferences. While the amended rule
does not require a court to conduct a discovery scheduling conference in
every case, if a court exercises its discretion to hold such a conference,
Rule 16(a) now requires it to enter an order memorializing what took
place, including any agreements reached by the parties that relate to discovery issues.194
• Rule 26(b)(1)—Scope of Discovery/Metadata
As part of the “core of the e-discovery framework,”195 H.B. 380
amended Rule 26(b)(1) to add ESI as a category of discoverable information.196 In recognition of the fact that ESI often contains relevant information that is buried or hidden in digital code (otherwise known as “metadata”), H.B. 380 expanded the definition of ESI “to include not only the
information contained on the screen view of [a] file[,] but also reasonably accessible metadata that reflect such key information as date sent,
date received, author, and recipients.”197 However, the E-Discovery
Committee drafted the amended rule “to focus electronic discovery on

191. Id. at 2.
192. Id.
193. The E-Discovery Committee also made various technical changes to the rules at
issue, such as to incorporate gender neutrality. Id. at 1. This article does not review or
address these technical changes.
194. H.B. 380, Gen. Assem., 2011–2012 Sess. (N.C. 2011); E-DISCOVERY COMM.
REPORT, supra note 19, at 2.
195. E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 2.
196. H.B. 380, Gen. Assem., 2011–2012 Sess. (N.C. 2011); E-DISCOVERY COMM.
REPORT, supra note 19, at 2.
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) cmt. to amendment (2011).
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the kinds of metadata that will be relevant in most cases” by specifically
excluding other types of metadata from the definition of ESI and “making that metadata not subject to discovery unless the parties agree . . . or
the court orders disclosure.”198
• Rule 26(b)(2)—Proportionality of Discovery
Although H.B. 380 did not alter Rule 26(b)(2) in any meaningful
way, the fact that the legislation retained the proportionality provision
contained in this rule is, as discussed in more detail below, significant to
the overall effectiveness of the legislation in addressing the burdens of ediscovery. As is relevant here, Rule 26(b)(2) continues to require a court
to limit the “frequency or extent” of discovery when it “is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.”200 Put differently, Rule
26(b)(2) mandates that a court ensure that a party’s use of discovery is
proportional to the needs of the case.201
199

• Rules 26(b)(3) and 34(b)—Accessibility Limitations on
Discovery of ESI
Amended Rules 26(b)(3) and 34(b) allow a party to resist discovery
of ESI by interposing an objection that the ESI sought is “not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost,” or that the format of the requested ESI production is objectionable.202 Where such an objection is
raised, Rules 26(c) and 37(a)(2) clarify that the burden rests with the
objecting party to prove that the information is, in fact, not reasonably
accessible, and that, upon a showing of good cause, a court can order
production even where the objecting party carries this burden.203

198. Id.
199. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(2) cmt. to amendment (2011).
200. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(2).
201. Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 600 (E.D.
Wis. 2004) (discussing the comparable proportionality mandate contained in FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
202. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rules 26(b)(3), 34(b).
203. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(c) cmt. to amendment (2011), Rule 37(a)(2) cmt. to amendment (2011).
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• Rule 26(b)(3)—Allocation of E-Discovery Costs
Under Rule 26(b)(3), a court now has the express authority to allocate the costs of e-discovery between the parties.204 Significantly, the
amended rule does not condition the court’s authority to make such an
allocation on a party first moving for or otherwise requesting an allocation of costs.205
• Rule 26(b)(7)—The Discovery of Privileged Documents
H.B. 380 added a new Rule 26(b)(7) to incorporate two significant
privilege-related protections.206 Under Rule 26(b)(7)(a), a party withholding documents on the basis of privilege must now expressly make
the claim of privilege and must provide sufficient information about the
withheld documents to allow the receiving party to assess fully the
claim.207 Under Rule 26(b)(7)(b), a party can mitigate the inadvertent
production of privileged information by providing notice to the receiving party, who then is obligated to return, sequester, or destroy the information in question, though the party can submit the information to
the court to review the claim of privilege.208
• Rule 26(f)—Discovery Scheduling Conferences
One of the most significant and important changes incorporated in
H.B. 380 was the creation of a new discovery scheduling conference, or
“meet and confer” process. Under amended Rule 26(f), any party involved in civil litigation can request a discovery scheduling conference
and, after such a request is made, the opposing party is required to attend.209 During the “meet and confer,” parties are required to “consider
the nature and basis of the parties’ claims and defenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case and . . . discuss the prepa-

204. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(3) cmt. to amendment (2011) (noting that Rule 26(b)(3)
“specifically recognizes the authority of the court to specify conditions for electronic discovery, including allocation of the costs of that discovery”).
205. See id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(3).
206. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(7) cmt. to amendment (2011).
207. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(7)(a).
208. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(7)(b).
209. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f).
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ration of a discovery plan”210 that includes “a statement of the issues as
they then appear.”211
The new rule specifically encourages the parties to consider, where
appropriate, (a) the preservation of ESI;212 (b) “the media form, format,
or procedures by which [ESI] will be produced;”213 (c) “the allocation of
the costs of preservation, production, and, if necessary, restoration, of
[ESI];”214 (d) “the method for asserting or preserving claims of privilege
or of protection of the information as trial-preparation materials if different from that provided in [Rule 26(b)(7)];”215 (e) “the method for asserting or preserving confidentiality and proprietary status” of documents or
ESI;216 (f) “any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery, including,
if appropriate under the circumstances of the case, that discovery be
conducted in phases or be limited to or focused on particular issues;”217
and (g) any agreements between the parties to limit discovery through
the use of a protective order under Rule 26(c).218 After the conference is
held, the parties must either submit a joint discovery plan to the court if
they reach agreement on all issues or separate plans if they cannot.219
Thereafter, Rule 26(f) requires the court to enter a discovery scheduling
order upon motion of either party.220
The commentary to Rule 26(f) explicitly encourages parties to delay
the discovery scheduling conference “until all parties can become sufficiently familiar with the issues arising in the action and the potential
sources of discovery information” to ensure that the “discovery meeting
will be meaningful, beneficial, and productive.”221 Additionally, the
commentary incorporates by reference the commentary to the 2006
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), and advises that it
“can provide guidance regarding discovery of electronically stored information where applicable.”222 This decision on the part of the EDiscovery Committee is particularly significant because of the emphasis
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(2)(i)–(ii).
Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(3)(i).
Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(3)(iii).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(3)(iv).
Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(3)(vi).
Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(2).
Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(4).
Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f) cmt. to amendment (2011).
Id.
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that the commentary to Federal Rule 26(f) places on engagement between the parties on the issue of e-discovery and the benefits that can be
achieved through cooperative agreements regarding issues, such as preservation and privilege, that have proved so problematic in e-discovery
practice.223
• Rule 33(c)—Responding to Interrogatories Using Business
Records
H.B. 380 made a slight change to Rule 33(c) to clarify that a party
can now respond to an interrogatory by producing and referring to ESI
where “the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially
the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party
served.”224 However, Rule 33(c) now requires a party who relies on
business records or ESI in this manner to provide “sufficient detail to
permit the interrogating party to locate and to identify, as readily as can
the party served, the records from which the answer may be ascertained,”225 and the commentary to the amendments warn that a party invoking this provision “may be required to provide direct access to its
electronic information system . . . if . . . necessary to afford the requesting party an adequate opportunity to derive or ascertain the answer to
the interrogatory.”226
• Rule 34(a)—Requests for Production of ESI
H.B. 380 revised Rule 34(a) to include ESI within the scope of information of which a party can request production in discovery.227 It is
significant to note that H.B. 380 retained the language that allows a party
to request an opportunity to “test or sample” information that falls within the scope of Rule 34(a).228 By expanding the scope of this rule to encompass ESI while simultaneously retaining the “test and sample” provision, H.B. 380 expressly allows a party to conduct a forensic
examination of an ESI repository (i.e., hard drive, thumb drive, etc.)
where appropriate.

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Advisory Committee’s note on 2006 amendments).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 33(c).
Id.
Id. § 1A-1, Rule 33(c) cmt. to amendment (2011).
Id. § 1A-1, Rule 34(a) cmt. to amendment (2011).
Id. § 1A-1, Rule 34(a)(i).
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• Rule 34(b)—Form of Production of ESI
H.B. 380 also amended Rule 34(b) in two significant ways. First, a
party must produce ESI “as [it is] kept in the usual course of business or
must organize and label [it] to correspond to the categories in the discovery request.”229 By incorporating this mandate, Rule 34(b) seeks “to
protect against deliberate or inadvertent production in ways that raise
unnecessary obstacles for the requesting party.”230 Put differently, this
“provision prohibits ‘simply dumping large quantities of unrequested
material[] onto [a] discover[y] party along with the items actually
sought.’”231 Second, the amended rule allows the party requesting discovery to specify the form in which the responding party should produce ESI and, in the absence of such a specification, allows the responding party to produce ESI in any “reasonably usable form,” but does not
require production in more than one form.232 The commentary to the
amendments further clarifies that it is inappropriate for a party to withhold production based on an objection to the requested form of production of ESI and that, in such situation, the objecting party “must propose
an alternative form or forms” of production.233
• Rule 37(c)—Safe Harbor for the Loss of ESI under Certain
Circumstances
Amended Rule 37(c) incorporates a safe harbor protection that relates to a litigant’s common law duty to preserve relevant information
when litigation arises or is reasonably anticipated to arise.234 Under Rule
37(c), a party is protected from spoliation sanctions—except in exceptional circumstances—where ESI that is subject to the preservation duty
is “lost as a result of routine, good-faith operation of an electronic infor-

229. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 34(b)(1).
230. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 34(b) cmt. to amendment (2011).
231. S.E.C. v. Colins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (construing the federal counterpart to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b) (quoting
8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2213 (2008))).
232. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 34(b).
233. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 34(b) cmt. to amendment (2011).
234. See Inventory Locator Serv., LLC v. PartsBase, Inc., No. 02-2695-MaV, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 46252, at *37 n.8 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2005) (noting relationship between
duty to preserve and safe-harbor provision in what was then-proposed FED. R. CIV. P.
37(f)).
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mation system.”235 This safe harbor does not vitiate a party’s obligation
to institute preservation measures when a triggering event occurs, but
recognizes the sometime-mercurial nature of electronic information governance and provides a modicum of protection where ESI is inadvertently lost.236
• Rule 45—Subpoenas Seeking Production of ESI
H.B. 380 made a number of changes to Rule 45 that incorporate ESI
into the subpoena process.237 These changes largely mirror those to the
rules that govern discovery between the parties to a lawsuit, and create
similar substantive rights and obligations for those involved in discovery
under Rule 45 subpoenas.238 For example, a party can specifically subpoena ESI from a non-party239 who can object to the subpoena on
grounds that the requested ESI is not reasonably accessible.240
Through these various amendments, the E-Discovery Committee
designed a general framework to govern the discovery of ESI in state
court litigation. When read in isolation or analyzed from a technical
perspective, these rule changes may seem somewhat modest and largely
uneventful. With few exceptions, H.B. 380 does not dramatically change
the rights and duties of parties engaged in discovery. However, the
seeming simplicity of the legislation’s design does not reflect the true
depth of its impact, as discussed in the following section.
B. The Impact of H.B. 380 on the Discovery Process in North Carolina
When summarizing its work, the E-Discovery Committee stated
that the proposed rules reflected “significant differences” from the 2006
Amendments and, thus, the prevailing e-discovery rules in the federal

235. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 37(c); see also id. cmt. to amendment (2011) (clarifying that the safe harbor only applies “to information lost due to . . . the ways in which
[electronic information systems] generally are designed, programmed, and implemented
to meet the party’s technical and business needs”).
236. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 37(c) cmt. to amendment (2011) (“Section (c) is an effort to
recognize a necessary balance between normal computer system operations and the
needs of litigation.”).
237. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 45 cmt. to amendment (2011) (“Rule 45 is amended to conform
the provisions for subpoenas to changes in other discovery rules, largely related to discovery of electronically stored information.”).
238. Id.
239. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 45(a)(1)(b).
240. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 45(d)(4).
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courts.241 Although the committee did not specifically delineate these
perceived differences, the procedural framework that it created and the
basic approach that it adopted incorporated perhaps the two most important principles embodied in the 2006 Amendments: cooperation and
proportionality. If actively promoted by the courts and embraced by litigants, these two principles have the potential to shift the discovery
process in the North Carolina state courts from the current adversarial
paradigm towards a more efficient and less contentious future.
i.

H.B. 380 Will Promote Greater Communication and Cooperation
in Discovery

Prior to H.B. 380, the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
created a structurally adversarial paradigm in discovery that did little to
promote cooperation between the parties. The rules allowed parties to
request various types of discovery from one another and imposed various penalties on parties who failed to respond to discovery,242 but, except in limited circumstances,243 did not require parties ever to engage
with one another directly on any issue related to discovery unless and
until a dispute had already developed.244 This lack of structured engagement between the parties created a vacuum in which adversarial approaches to discovery blossomed. For example, in one case, a court defaulted a defendant who flatly refused to produce certain information
requested in discovery—even after the court compelled it to do so—on
grounds that the information did not relate to a claim or defense at issue
in the case.245 Although one cannot say for certain that engagement between the parties in that particular matter would have made a difference,
the disputed issue there is precisely the type that parties can clarify—if
not resolve entirely—through constructive pre-discovery dialogue.246
241. E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 1.
242. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rules 26, 33, 34, and 37 (2009).
243. See id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f1) (requiring discovery scheduling conference in medical
malpractice action).
244. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 37(a)(2) (requiring party to certify that, prior to filing motion to
compel, it “has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party
failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or material without
court action”).
245. Kewaunee Scientific Corp. v. E. Scientific Prods., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 451, 451–52
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
246. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(1)–(3) (2009) (requiring parties to include a statement of the issues involved in a matter and any limitations on discovery in a
proposed discovery scheduling submitted to the court following a discovery scheduling
conference); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f) cmt. to amendment (2011) (encouraging
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H.B. 380 sets the stage for parties to engage in just such a dialogue
by creating a new “meet and confer” process under Rule 26(f) that will
foster constructive engagement between the parties early in a case.247 Although not mandatory in every civil matter, this new process will likely
occur in a significant percentage of cases—particularly those likely to
involve substantial e-discovery—given that Rule 26(f) now allows any
party to obtain the certainty of a discovery scheduling order, but conditions entry of such an order on the parties’ first conducting a “meet and
confer.”248 This new rule does not—and, indeed, could not—force the
parties to agree on an overall discovery plan or even a single provision of
such a plan, but it does require them to talk and, as the federal courts
have demonstrated, it is this mechanism of engagement that has proven
so effective at promoting the type of cooperation that prevents certain ediscovery disputes from developing.249
Prior to adoption of the 2006 Amendments, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure had long incorporated a “meet and confer” process under Rule 16 that required the parties to discuss case management and
discovery scheduling in civil matters,250 but primarily focused on administrative and ministerial topics, such as how many interrogatories a party
could serve and the deadline for disclosing experts, rather than more
substantive issues.251 As a result, initial pre-trial conferences conducted
under this prior iteration of Rule 16 did not result in parties collectively
engaging in constructive dialog about their case or individually spending
time before the conference exploring the full contours of the discovery
necessitated by the claims and defenses at issue in the case.252 Although
a diligent party would certainly approach the Rule 16 conference with
some understanding of these issues, there was generally little need to
conduct a more thorough investigation at that stage of the proceeding.
parties to delay discovery scheduling conference “until all parties can become sufficiently
familiar with the issues arising in the action”).
247. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f) cmt. to amendment (2011).
248. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(4) (2011).
249. Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207 (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magistrate
judges reported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat effective
in “improving the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences,” 80.5% reported it as at
least somewhat effective in “encourag[ing] more cooperation,” and 61.1% reported it as
at least somewhat effective in “reduc[ing] the number of e-discovery disputes” decided by
survey participants).
250. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (2000).
251. Id.
252. See Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207 (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magistrate judges reported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat effective in “improving the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences”).
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The demands of e-discovery, however, led the Federal Rules Committee to place a new emphasis on the “meet and confer” process with
the goal of having the parties think about e-discovery issues early in a
case, engage with one another on those issues, and, optimally, reach
agreement on basic parameters for the discovery of ESI.253 This approach of promoting cooperation as a means of addressing the burdens
of e-discovery has worked exceedingly well,254 in large part because
every party involved in litigation in which a large volume of ESI may
come into play has a strong incentive to narrow the scope of discovery as
much as possible.255 Even in asymmetric litigation, parties with fewer
resources benefit when the wheat is separated from the chaff in ediscovery, thereby eliminating—or at least reducing—the need to manage large quantities of documents that, though responsive to discovery,
do nothing to move their cases forward.256
Since the 2006 Amendments took effect, the federal courts have
seen a significant increase in the number of litigants reaching cooperative agreements on such e-discovery related issues as the scope of the

253. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 26–27; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Advisory Committee’s note on the 2006 amendments).
254. See Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207.
255. See Bennett B. Borden et al., Four Years Later: How the 2006 Amendments to the
Federal Rules Have Reshaped the E-Discovery Landscape and are Revitalizing the Civil Justice System, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 17 (2011) [hereinafter Four Years Later]. The authors stated that
Much of the consternation surrounding electronic discovery has resulted from
the fact that parties adopting bareknuckled approaches to discovery in the age
of ESI have driven the cost of litigation beyond all reasonable bounds. Parties
who approach electronic discovery in this fashion often find themselves facing
legal discovery bills that exceed the underlying amount in controversy and
come to dominate the litigation.
Id. See also Lisa M. Arent, Robert D. Brownstone & William A. Fenwick, EDiscovery:
Preserving, Requesting & Producing Electronic Information, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 131, 178 (2002) (“Reciprocity can act as a check on unreasonable and
premature requests for intensive electronic discovery. When the parties are both businesses and/or the electronic discovery burdens weigh similarly on each side, there is an
element of mutually assured destruction.”).
256. See Chevron Corp. v. E-Tech Int’l, No. 10cv1146-IEG (WMc), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 53812, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. May 19, 2011) (discussing court’s use of an e-discovery
protocol to narrow scope of forensic examination); D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc.,
256 F.R.D. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 2009) (limiting scope of forensic search and noting that
sometimes “[a] judge must simply draw a reasonable line between the likely and the unlikely, the discoverable and the prohibited, the wheat and the chaff”).
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duty to preserve ESI,257 the protocol that the parties will use to search for
relevant ESI,258 and the format in which the parties will produce ESI.259
The benefits of such cooperation are manifest: by reaching agreement on
these issues, litigants are able to reduce—or eliminate—the likelihood
of disputes that were far more prevalent a decade ago when such issues
often went unaddressed.260 When surveyed about the effectiveness of
this new process, a clear majority of United States Magistrate Judges reported that the revisions to Rule 26(f) had increased the effectiveness of
the pre-trial “meet and confer,” promoted greater cooperation between
the parties, and reduced the number of discovery disputes in their
courts.261
To a significant extent, the federal judiciary has driven this shift
toward cooperation. Even as litigants clung tightly to discovery norms
or attempted to use the new rules as an adversarial tool,262 the federal
courts whole-heartedly embraced the view that adversarial conduct is
not compatible with the realities of e-discovery, and that litigants have a
paramount responsibility to cooperate in discovery. For example, Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm of the District of Maryland recently declined to
rule directly on a motion to compel production of ESI and, instead, or-

257. See, e.g., United States v. La. Generating, LLC, No. 09-100-RET-CN, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20207, at *2–11 (M.D. La. Mar. 5, 2010).
258. See, e.g., Northington v. H&M Int’l, No. 08-CV-6297, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14366, at *10–11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011).
259. See, e.g., Premier Int’l Assocs., LLC v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. 2-05CV506TJW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97541, at *15 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2007).
260. See Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., 248 F.R.D. 169, 171 (D. Del. 2006) (considering
motion to compel production of database in case in which “the parties . . . never agreed
that electronic documents would be produced in any particular format”). But see Diesel
Mach., Inc. v. Manitowoc Crane Grp., No. CIV 09-4087-RAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15780, at *2–11 (D.S.D. Feb. 16, 2011) (denying motion to compel party to produce ESI
in native format in accordance with agreement between parties where party had already
produced ESI in PDF format).
261. Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207 (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magistrate
judges reported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat effective
in “improving the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences,” 80.5% reported it as at
least somewhat effective in “encourage[ing] more cooperation,” and 61.1% reported it as
at least somewhat effective in “reduc[ing] the number of e-discovery disputes” decided by
survey participants).
262. Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-volving Duties in Discovery, 36
N. KY. L. REV. 521, 553 (2009) (discussing the view of one lawyer-commentator that “the
time and expense needed to prepare for the post-2006 Rule 26(f) conference [are justified] on the grounds that doing so will provide ‘ammunition to constrain demands made
by the other side’”).
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dered the parties to seek a cooperative solution to the dispute.263 In a
similar vein, Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer of the District of Colorado
ordered parties to seek cooperative resolutions to their disagreements
“consistent with well-established case law and the principles underlying
The Cooperation Proclamation.”264 The Middle District of North Carolina
has gone so far as to adopt a local rule specifically requiring counsel “to
cooperate and be courteous with each other in all phases of the discovery process.”265
This judicial embrace of cooperation is not surprising given the judiciary’s general disdain of discovery disputes266 and the efficiencies realized from avoiding disputes as trivial as whether information should be
produced in one electronic format over another.267 However, parties also
benefit by embracing cooperative behavior. In recent years, courts have
shown increasing favor towards parties who—when confronted with a
discovery dispute—offer cooperative, constructive, and reasonable solutions. For example, a party who offered a phased ESI protocol that
would initially cover three custodians over a three year period prevailed
in a dispute over the opposing party who sought a protocol that would
cover forty custodians over a six year period.268 Another court granted
the defendant’s motion to compel the opposing parties to use an outside
vendor to assist with their collection, review, and production of ESI in
part because the defendant offered to split the cost of the vendor in order
to accelerate the pace of discovery even though it was under no duty to
do so.269
These cases represent a growing trend of parties obtaining a narrower overall scope of e-discovery simply by adopting a cooperative ap263. Anderson v. Reliance Standard. Life Ins. Co., No. WDQ-11-1188, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 117058, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 11, 2011).
264. Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01-cv-01644-REB-CBS, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17857, at *41 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010).
265. M.D.N.C. LR 26.1(b)(1); see also EEOC v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 1:09CV700,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35195, at *32 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011) (“[T]his Court’s Local
Rule 26.1(b)(1) . . . require[s] attorneys to conduct discovery in a cooperative fashion.”).
266. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44, 50 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (criticizing the parties for having drafted “dueling epistles for submission to the
Court” rather than “focus[ing] their attention on discussing their differences”).
267. See, e.g., Silicon Labs Integration, Inc. v. Melman, No. C08-04030 RMW (HRL),
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122871, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2010) (“Plaintiff represents to
this court that defendant's documents have been produced in PDF format, not TIFF.”).
268. Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491 at
*8–12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010).
269. Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 5:08-cv-05391 JW (HRL), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71221, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. July. 9, 2010).
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proach. When such parties opt for a more adversarial stance, the court
confronts a much starker dispute in which it must decide between allowing the requesting party everything it requests, nothing it requests, or
something in between that the court is left to craft on its own.270 By approaching discovery in a more cooperative fashion, parties are able to
gain greater control over disputes that arise and, thereby, narrow the
scope of ESI that they must collect, process, search, review, and produce.271 The end result of this cooperative approach is lower costs and a
more efficient discovery process.272
As the federal court experience has shown, promoting cooperation
is a powerful method of mitigating the burdens of e-discovery. Through
the combination of the 2006 Amendments, the support of the judiciary,
and the recognition by counsel of the associated benefits, this paradigmatic shift has already substantially impacted many notions long-held by
attorneys of how discovery should be conducted.273 This shift, however,
remains a work in progress given the number of ESI-related disputes that
continue to come before the federal courts as a result of adversarial conduct on the part of one or both parties.274
With the advent of the new “meet and confer” process, H.B. 380 sets
North Carolina on a similar path as the federal courts. By promoting
engagement between the parties with the goal of crafting a cooperative
plan for discovery, Rule 26(f) now fosters the same type of collaborative

270. DeGeer v. Gillis, 755 F. Supp. 2d 909, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (noting that neither
party had “approached production of . . . ESI with a spirit of cooperation and efficiency,”
but conditionally granting defendants’ motion to compel, and admonishing the parties to
cooperate prospectively).
271. The Sedona Conference, The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 342
(2009), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/tsc_cooperation_
proclamation/caseforcooperation.pdf (suggesting that a cooperative approach “allows the
parties to save money, maintain greater control over the dispersal of information, maintain goodwill with courts, and address the litigation’s merits at the earliest practicable
time”).
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Hausfeld LLP and Milberg LLP, E-Discovery Today: The Fault Lies Not In
Our Rules . . ., 2011 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 35 (2011) (stating that “enhanced cooperation
among parties . . . is the most powerful tool available to reduce the costs and burdens of
e-discovery” and that “[t]hose who hold fast to the outdated notion that adversarial discovery is the only way to litigate are clinging to the railing of a sinking ship”).
274. See, e.g., Accounting Principals, Inc. v. Solomon Edwards Grp., LLC, No. 092085-CM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82071, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2010) (characterizing
the discovery dispute at issue as “the litigation equivalent of the cafeteria food fight scene
in the infamous movie Animal House” before ordering a conference to discuss salient issues).
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environment in state court discovery that the 2006 Amendments fostered in the federal courts, although arguably to a slightly lesser degree
given that the “meet and confer” is not mandatory in all state court cases.275 Nevertheless, by setting the stage for engagement and cooperation,
there is every reason to believe that North Carolina will experience the
same type of cooperative shift as the federal courts, particularly given the
strong incentive that parties have to collaborate in order to obtain the
benefits that flow from a discovery scheduling order.276
It is significant to note that this new procedure and the cooperative
possibilities that it creates could not have come at a better time for the
state court system in North Carolina. Between state-level budget cuts,277
and significant caseloads,278 the resources of the State courts have been
stretched increasingly thin in recent years. By aggressively promoting a
more cooperative approach to discovery, State court judges can—as the
federal judiciary has done—reduce the number and intensity of the discovery disputes that they confront and thereby conserve the resources
that they would otherwise have to allocate to the management of such
disputes. Indeed, litigants in federal court now routinely reach cooperative agreements on basic discovery-related issues that, as recently as a
decade ago, generated full-blown discovery disputes 279 and have begun
275. E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 1.
276. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f) (2011) (providing that the court may “enter an order tentatively . . . establishing a plan and schedule for discovery” following a
discovery conference wherein the parties are expected to cooperate and to establish a
discovery plan).
277. See N.C. Judicial Department Voluntary Reduction-in-Force Plan, THE NORTH
CAROLINA COURT SYSTEM, http://www.nccourts.org/News/NewsDetail.asp?id=1383&type=
1&archive=False (last visited Jan. 15, 2012) (detailing voluntary reduction-in-force plan
to address anticipated budget cuts).
278. See Phillip Bantz, State Business Court Straining Under Caseload, NORTH CAROLINA
LAWYERS
WEEKLY,
July
29,
2011,
available
at
http://nclawyersweekly.com/2011/07/29/state-business-courts-straining-under-caseload.
279. Compare Kay Beer Distrib. v. Energy Brands, Inc., No. 07-C-1068, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 130595, at *17 (E.D. Wis. June 10, 2009) (noting that “the parties had
agreed at their Rule 26 conference that either a hard copy or electronic copy [of responsive documents] would be produced depending on what was most cost-effective”), White
v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-216, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112102, at *11
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 2008) (noting that “the parties agreed in the Rule 26(f) Report to
produce all documents on paper”), and Hassaine v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., No.
09CV2215-MMA (BGS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34117, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2011)
(noting that “the parties agreed to produce any electronic information in written format”), with Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., 248 F.R.D. 169, 171 (D. Del. 2006) (considering
motion to compel production of database in case in which “the parties . . . never agreed
that electronic documents would be produced in any particular format”).
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to use collaborative agreements to address issues of preservation that are
not currently governed by the federal rules.280
ii.

H.B. 380 Will Promote Greater Proportionality in Discovery

North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) has long incorporated
the same proportionality principles as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,281 with the text of the State rule closely tracking the federal rule.282
The North Carolina rule reads:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in section (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery
in the action to obtain the information sought; or
(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on
the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.
The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under section (c).283

Regardless, North Carolina State courts have adhered to a liberal discovery paradigm, rarely invoking Rule 26(b)(1) to vary a party’s discovery

280. Compare United States v. La. Generating, LLC, No. 09-100-RET-CN, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20207, at *2–11 (M.D. La. Mar. 5, 2010) (noting stipulated preservation order freeing parties of duty to preserve certain categories of information), and In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md02100-DRH-PMF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14092, at *1–11 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2010) (entering agreed-upon preservation order limiting information that plaintiffs had duty to preserve in class action lawsuit), with Mini-Conference on Preservation and Sanctions, Sept. 9,
2011, at 7, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/DallasMiniConf_
Materials/Notes%20from%20the%20Mini-Conference%20on%20Preservation%20and%
20Sanctions.pdf [hereinafter Mini-Conference] (detailing discussions regarding need for
rule changes to govern preservation).
281. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2009), with FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2). See also Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 01 CVS 10614, 2006 NCBC LEXIS
16, at *41–42 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (conducting a proportionality analysis under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)).
282. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2009), with FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2).
283. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2009).
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obligation.284 H.B. 380, however, breathes new life into this underutilized rule by emphasizing the need for a greater balance in the discovery
of ESI.
The principle of proportional discovery, reflected in both the federal and state versions of Rule 26(b), rests on the concept that discovery
should be only as broad as necessary to advance the merits of a civil action or, put differently, that no party should face discovery unless the associated burdens are justified by the value of the information to the litigation.285 With the advent of ESI, the potential gulf between a discovery
request for “all documents” on a given subject and one more narrowly
tailored became enormous. For example, in one North Carolina case, a
party reduced the scope of an ESI search from 2500 to 400 backup tapes
simply by focusing its document requests.286 The new focus on cooperation in H.B. 380 will go a long way in achieving these efficiencies, but
principles of proportional discovery serve as an important adjunct to
limit the scope of discovery when its utility does not outweigh the burdens associated with its production.
284. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at
*17–18 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (quashing subpoena based on proportionality
analysis); Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at *41–42 (declining to limit electronic discovery based on undue burden, but requiring parties to share the costs of ediscovery); Phelps-Dickson Builders, LLC v. Amerimann Partners, 617 S.E.2d 664, 668
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Rule 26(b)(1) as part of general reference to scope of discovery); Joyce v. Joyce, COA03-1314, 2004 N.C. App. LEXIS 2119, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App.
Dec. 7, 2004) (citing Rule 26(b)(1) as part of general reference to scope of discovery);
Lindsey v. Boddie-Noell Enters., Inc., 555 S.E.2d 369, 373 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d on
other grounds, 562 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 2002) (limiting discovery because “plaintiff had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought” (internal
quotations omitted)).
285. See, e.g., Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at *36 (“Electronic discovery burdens must be proportional to the amount in controversy and nature of the case.
Otherwise transaction costs due to electronic discovery will overwhelm the ability to resolve disputes fairly in litigation.” (quoting The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Principles: Best Practices Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Document Production 17
(2005))); Azalea Garden Bd. & Care, Inc. v. Vanhoy, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *13 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2009) (stating that “discovery must be . . . proportional to what is at issue in
the litigation”) (quoting Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357–63
(D. Md. 2008)).
286. See Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Dennis Richter, Bank
of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS-5564), available at
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber=0
5CVS5564; Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 3, Affidavit of Carl Hardel, Bank of
Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS-5564), available at
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber=0
5CVS5564.
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As an initial matter, it is important to note that H.B. 380 does not
alter, change or amend the existing proportionality principles in Rule
26(b)(1). The new rules, however, augment a court’s power to proportion discovery by authorizing parties to modulate the scope of electronic
discovery on the same grounds.287 Under Rules 26(b)(3) and 34(b), a
party can resist the discovery of ESI that is “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”288 Unlike Rule 26(b)(1), the decision of
whether to invoke these accessibility limitations rests—at least in the
first instance—with the party from which discovery is sought and on
which the burden would fall. A party can invoke these rules to object
and narrow the scope of its discovery responses to only those documents
or data sources that are “reasonably accessible.”289 Under Rule 26(c), a
party can take a more proactive approach and seek a protective order to
impose similar limits on the scope of discovery.290
In either instance, the party’s ability to resist discovery on accessibility grounds ultimately turns on the same factors that govern the
court’s power under Rule 26(b)(1)(iii): undue burden and cost. By tying
the accessibility limitations to these factors, H.B. 380 functionally expands the role of proportionality when ESI is at issue. Indeed, because
the court is the ultimate arbiter of whether any given discovery request
is unduly burdensome or costly, the proportionality factors in Rule
26(b)(1)(iii) now serve as the basic guide that parties can use when
crafting ESI requests and analyzing the proper scope of an ESI production, given that they are the same factors that a court would use if a dispute later arose.

287. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rules 26(c), 34(b) (2011). Unlike Rule 26(b)(1), which
only authorizes a court to proportion any form of discovery, the new authority created
under H.B. 380 only applies to discovery involving ESI. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule
26(c) (“A party seeking a protective order on the basis that electronically stored information sought is from a source identified as not reasonably accessible . . . .” (emphasis added)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 Rule 34(b) (“In addition to other bases for objection, the
response [to a request for production of electronically stored information] may state an
objection to production of electronically stored information from sources that the party
identified as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” (emphasis added)).
288. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rules 26(b)(3), 34(b).
289. See Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *42 (quoting CONF. OF CHIEF
JUSTICES, supra note 12).
290. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(c) (“Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judge of the court in
which the action is pending may make any order which justice requires to protect a party
or person from . . . undue burden or expense . . . .”).
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In two decisions that pre-date H.B. 380, the North Carolina Business Court demonstrated the power and flexibility of these proportionality principles.291 Significantly, but perhaps not surprisingly, in both
Bank of America Corp. v. SR International Business Insurance Co. and Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, Judge Ben Tennille used a proportionality
analysis to resolve disputes over the scope of e-discovery.292 In Bank of
America Corp., Judge Tennille considered a defendant’s motion to compel compliance with a Rule 45 subpoena that would have required a
non-party to search for and produce ESI that was spread across up to
2500 backup tapes located in Charlotte, New York, London, and Bermuda at an estimated cost of over $1.5 million.293 In Analog Devices, Inc.,
the court considered a motion to compel production of ESI that was contained on approximately 400 backup tapes and was estimated to cost at
least $54,000.294 In each case, Judge Tennille resolved the dispute by
conducting a subjective analysis of whether the value of the information
sought outweighed the circumstances surrounding the claims of undue
burden.295
In Bank of America Corp., Judge Tennille found that the exigencies
involved were paramount based on:
(1) the size of the expense and the burden of production placed upon a
nonparty, (2) the breadth of the information sought, (3) the availability
of information from other sources, (4) the fact that the information
sought was on inaccessible backup tapes, (5) the absence of any unwarranted or suspicious destruction of information, and (6) the low level of
marginal utility shown at this stage of the proceedings.296

In Analog Devices, Inc., Judge Tennille conducted a similar analysis
before narrowing the dispositive issues down to cost and relevance, and
ultimately concluding that “[t]he uncertainty of the cost combined with
291. See generally Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17; Analog Devices, Inc., 2006
NCBC LEXIS 16.
292. Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *32; Analog Devices, Inc., 2006
NCBC LEXIS 16, at *39–45.
293. See Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Dennis Richter, Bank
of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS-5564), available at
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber=0
5CVS5564; Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 3, Affidavit of Carl Hardel, Bank of
Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS-5564), available at
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber=0
5CVS5564.
294. Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at *40–41.
295. Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17–18; Analog Devices, Inc., 2006
NCBC LEXIS 16, at *39–45.
296. Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17–18.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012

51

VICK FINAL

3/23/2012 2:25 PM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2

284

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:233

the potential probative value of the discovery [wa]s too great to deny”
production of the ESI.297 Judge Tennille further concluded, however,
that the level of uncertainty in his analysis justified cost-shifting and
therefore ordered the parties to share the cost of restoring the backup
tapes.298
Both of these opinions are less important for the conclusions that
Judge Tennille reached than the process that he used to reach them. In
each case, Judge Tennille asked whether the exigent circumstances surrounding discovery in the case (i.e., the parties’ resources, the cost of
discovery, the value of the information, etc.) outweighed North Carolina’s presumptive policy of liberal discovery.299 Although courts had previously used Rule 26(b)(1) to limit discovery (even if only sparingly),300
Bank of America Corp. and Analog Devices, Inc. represent some of the first
instances—if not the first instance301—of a State court fully exercising
its authority to determine whether to prevent discovery based on a subjective analysis of factors that, with the exception of potential probative
value, were disconnected from the merits of the action.
With its expansion of proportionality in discovery, H.B. 380 again
lays the groundwork for a fundamental change in how both litigants and
courts in the State approach discovery. The concept that discovery
should be only as broad as necessary to advance the merits of an action—and that a party should have the power to make this decision in
the first instance—is largely anathema to the liberal discovery tradition

297. Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at *45.
298. Id. Judge Tennille also reserved the issue of whether to order further cost shifting until later in the matter. Id. at *11.
299. Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17–18; Analog Devices, Inc., 2006
NCBC 16, at *45.
300. Lindsey v. Boddie-Noell Enters., Inc., 555 S.E.2d 369, 373 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001),
rev’d on other grounds, 562 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 2002) (limiting discovery because “plaintiff
had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought”) (internal quotations omitted).
301. North Carolina Superior and District Courts continue overwhelmingly to maintain court records in paper form and do not maintain any type of centralized repository
that can be readily searched to identify court orders that address any given issue or topic.
Lacking the resources necessary to conduct a thorough search of these paper court files
spread across the 100 counties of the State, the authors have been unable to determine
whether any trial courts other than the North Carolina Business Court have actively employed a proportionality analysis under Rule 26(b)(1). However, the authors have been
unable to identify any such case in which a discovery issue resolved in that manner by
the trial court has reached the Court of Appeals, with the possible exception of the perfunctory use of Rule 26(b)(1)(ii) in Lindsey v. Boddie-Noell Enterprises. See id.
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to which North Carolina has long adhered.302 However, in an environment where a traditional request for “all documents” on a given subject
can generate expenses as high as $70 million,303 the realities of electronic
discovery necessitate a change in this tradition. If courts actively promote and parties actively apply these proportionality principles, North
Carolina will realize a discovery process that is more streamlined, efficient, and focused on the merits of the dispute, rather than collateral
discovery issues.304
IV. PRACTICAL TOOLS TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY
As the process of discovering ESI has matured, attorneys, courts
and service providers—particularly those engaged in federal litigation—
have developed a number of tools and techniques to address and surmount the challenges associated with the discovery of large quantities of
ESI. In various ways, these tools and techniques seek either to constrain
the volume of ESI that goes fully through discovery or to streamline the
process through which that data passes. Although not exhaustive, the
following list represents a core group of tools that practitioners and their
clients can use—when appropriate—to manage some of the common
challenges that arise in this area.
• Phased Discovery Protocols
Phased discovery is a technique that controls the volume of ESI
subject to discovery at any one time and creates circumstances under
which the e-discovery process may terminate before reaching certain repositories of ESI. Whether implemented by agreement or court order, a
phased protocol segments the discovery process into a series of constituent elements in order to search for and reveal the most relevant information early in the discovery process.305 For example, a protocol might divide an undifferentiated mass of ESI into specific groups of custodians,

302. See In re Estate of Johnson, 697 S.E.2d 365, 366 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (noting
that trial court had ordered party to “provide full and complete answers and responses to
[opposing party’s] First and Second Discovery, without objection” (emphasis added)).
303. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557–58 (W.D.
Tenn. 2003) (estimating privilege review costs of “between $16.5 million and $70 million” (internal citations omitted)).
304. See generally Four Years Later, supra note 255.
305. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 365 (D. Md. 2008).
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designated periods of time, certain geographic areas, or any other categorizing principle that will group the ESI at issue into logical groups for
recovery and searching.306
Once the grouping is complete, the parties conduct discovery on
the constituent ESI elements in accordance with a predetermined set of
rules.307 Often, a protocol will set out specific triggers that prevent discovery from proceeding to a subsequent phase unless the information
produced in the current phase satisfies a certain threshold.308 One important benefit of conducting discovery in this segmented manner is that
parties can deal with ESI in more manageable chunks at a lower marginal cost and avoid the cost of discovery of certain groups of ESI altogether
if the information produced in the early phases leads to resolution or
demonstrates the futility of proceeding to later phases.
• Computer-Assisted Non-Linear Document Review
The enormous expenses associated with high-volume e-discovery
are often a result of a party’s pre-production review of the ESI that it has
previously identified, collected, processed, and searched. The costs associated with the collection of ESI can be significant, but rarely reach
stratospheric levels.309 In comparison, the costs associated with a traditional “eyes-on” linear ESI review in which each page of each document
is reviewed by at least one attorney can reach breathtaking heights. For

306. See, e.g., Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103491, at *12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010) (ordering phased search of ESI to begin with
three of the forty custodians requested by party seeking discovery); Makrakis v. DeMelis,
No. 09-706-C, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 223, at *6–7 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2010)
(ordering initial sampling of ESI from thirteen custodians to determine whether broader
search was justified).
307. See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at
*11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (ordering parties to prepare phased discovery protocol and
directing that “parties should identify which claims are most likely to go forward and
concentrate their discovery efforts in that direction before moving on to other claims”).
308. Vondriska v. Gerald Cugno & Paychex Bus. Solutions, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-1322-T24-TGW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92742, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2010) (describing
phased discovery process under which parties were unable to conduct discovery on merits of plaintiff’s claim prior to resolution of threshold issue under Fair Labor Standards
Act).
309. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 425–
26 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (detailing estimates of up to $84,000 for one party and $395,000 for
another party to collect and produce ESI). But see id. at 425 (detailing estimate of nearly
$10 million to select, catalogue, restore, and process all emails sought from one party
involved in lawsuit).
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example, in one matter, the cost of restoring, de-duping, and searching
ESI was approximately $600,000, which, although not a trivial sum,
paled in comparison to the $16.5 million to $70 million estimate for the
pre-production review of the ESI.310
In recent years, new technologies have emerged that dramatically
reduce the cost of review by employing advanced search and machine
learning technologies to group and code documents in a non-linear fashion.311 These technologies save costs by obviating the need for an attorney or multiple attorneys to review mechanically every single page of
every single document.312 Attorneys remain directly involved in this
process, but these technologies streamline the review process by using
various algorithms to classify documents by analyzing various characteristics of the constituent data.313
Although a full exploration of computer-assisted review is beyond
the scope of this Article, the efficiencies that they are capable of delivering are manifest. In one comparison, a computer-assisted non-linear review of over 20,000 documents was completed in one-tenth of the time
that it took for a traditional “eyes-on” linear review of the same set of
documents.314 Perhaps more importantly, not only was the computerassisted review significantly faster, the process was more accurate at
identifying and coding documents in a consistent manner than the traditional review process.315 Similar studies have produced similar results,316
demonstrating the power of these emerging technologies to increase
substantially the efficiency of e-discovery.

310. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557–58 (W.D.
Tenn. 2003).
311. See generally Bennett B. Borden et al., Why Document Review Is Broken, EDIG: EDISCOVERY & INFORMATION GOVERNANCE, (Williams Mullen, Richmond, VA.), May 2011
[hereinafter
Why
Document
Review
is
Broken],
available
at
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~oard/desi4/papers/borden.pdf
(discussing
computerassisted non-linear review); The Demise of Linear Review, supra note 8.
312. See generally Why Document Review Is Broken, supra note 311.
313. The Demise of Linear Review, supra note 8, at 2–3.
314. Why Document Review Is Broken, supra note 311, at 2–3.
315. Id.
316. Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in EDiscovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17
RICH J.L. & TECH. 11, 11 (2011) (“[T]echnology-assisted review processes . . . achieve[d]
results superior to those that could have been achieved through a manual review of [the
same] document collection . . . .”).
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• Preservation Agreements
The preservation of ESI once litigation begins or is reasonably anticipated remains one of the most challenging aspects of electronic discovery. With the risk of spoliation ever present,317 and the potentially catastrophic nature of related sanctions,318 parties continue to struggle with
the logistics and costs associated with simply ensuring that they do not
inadvertently lose or destroy information once the preservation obligation is triggered.319 In recent years, judges, practitioners and academics
have devoted a substantial amount of time to discussing whether further
rules are needed to define more clearly the duty to preserve.320 While
that debate has continued, courts and practitioners have sought to address this issue within the context of the current rules through stipulated preservation agreements and orders that specifically define what
parties must and—often more importantly—need not preserve. Such
agreements are beneficial because they not only provide parties with
clear direction on their preservation obligation, but they create a zone of
safety in which parties can free ESI from the burden of a litigation hold
without the fear of later facing a spoliation motion.321
• Privilege Agreements
The fear of losing the protections afforded by the attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine through waiver resulting from an
inadvertent disclosure of protected material is one of the primary reasons that review costs can mount so quickly when a large volume of ESI

317. See Mini-Conference, supra note 280, at 7.
318. See Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. BC Tech., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1216 (D.
Utah 2010) (recommending default sanction against party for failure to preserve ESI).
319. See Mini-Conference, supra note 280, at 2.
320. See id. (detailing discussions regarding the need for rule changes to govern preservation).
321. See, e.g., United States v. La. Generating, LLC, No. 09-100-RET-CN, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20207, at *2–11 (M.D. La. Mar. 5, 2010) (discussing a stipulated preservation order excluding eleven categories of data, including deleted computer files, from the
duty to preserve); In re: Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14092, at *1–11 (S.D.
Ill. Feb. 10, 2010) (noting a preservation order limiting the categories of documents and
data that plaintiffs in a class action have a duty to preserve).
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is subjected to the discovery process.322 The 2006 Amendments323 and
H.B. 380324 provide a base level of protection in an advertent disclosure
situation, but the danger of waiver nonetheless remains.325 Parties can
further reduce this risk, however, by entering a non-waiver agreement
and/or moving the court to enter a non-waiver order.326
Under a “non-waiver agreement,” parties agree that, under certain
circumstances, the production of privileged ESI during discovery does
not waive any privilege that attaches thereto.327 Such agreements typically set out a specific process that the parties agree to use to manage the
production of ESI and strengthen the protection of privilege within the
context of this process.328 For example, under so-called “quick peek”
322. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 426
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing estimated cost of pre-production privilege review of requested ESI).
323. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(5)(B). Additionally, revisions made to Federal Rule of Evidence 502 in 2008 strengthened the protection of privilege in federal court proceedings.
See FED. R. EVID. 502.
324. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, RULE 26(b)(7)(B) (2011).
325. Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 226–27 (E.D. Pa.
2008) (analyzing whether inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents resulted in
waiver under FED. R. CIV. P. 26 and FED. R. EVID. 502).
326. See Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 234–35 (D.
Md. 2005) (discussing “non-waiver agreements”).
327. See, e.g., Gruss v. Zwirn, No. 09 Civ. 6441 (PGG) (MHD), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79298, at *73–75 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011) (holding that party had not waived privilege
status of documents that were produced to government agency pursuant to non-waiver
agreement).
328. The notes of the advisory committee regarding the 2006 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are illuminative on this point:
Parties may attempt to minimize . . . costs and delays by agreeing to protocols
that minimize the risk of waiver. They may agree that the responding party
will provide certain requested materials for initial examination without waiving
any privilege or protection—sometimes known as a ‘quick peek.’ The requesting party then designates the documents it wishes to have actually produced.
This designation is the Rule 34 request. The responding party then responds in
the usual course, screening only those documents actually requested for formal
production and asserting privilege claims as provided in Rule 26(b)(5)(A). On
other occasions, parties enter agreements—sometimes called ‘clawback agreements’—that production without intent to waive privilege or protection should
not be a waiver so long as the responding party identifies the documents mistakenly produced, and that the documents should be returned under those circumstances. Other voluntary arrangements may be appropriate depending on
the circumstances of each litigation. In most circumstances, a party who receives information under such an arrangement cannot assert that production of
the information waived a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation
material.
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agreements, (1) the producing party makes the requested ESI available
for review without first conducting a full-fledged privilege review; (2)
the requesting party then reviews that ESI and designates the relevant
documents that it wants produced; and (3) the producing party then reviews those designated documents for privilege.329 Under such agreements, the parties explicitly agree that any disclosure of privileged material during the requesting party’s first-pass review of the ESI does not
waive any privilege that may attach to that ESI.330 Similarly, so-called
“claw back” agreements operate by allowing a party to produce requested
ESI without first conducting a full-fledged privilege review and then later recover any privileged documents that it produced with such disclosure triggering waiver.331
By rearranging certain aspects of the traditional discovery timeline
or instituting other protections, “non-waiver agreements” allow parties to
proceed with discovery without first conducting an exhaustive privilege
review and with a significantly reduced fear of any inadvertent disclosure resulting in a privilege waiver. These agreements, however, are not
without limitations.332 Because they are essentially contracts between
parties involved in the litigation, “non-waiver agreements” do not bind
non-parties to the litigation and, thus, any further disclosure of privileged information to such parties revives the waiver threat.333 Parties can
mitigate such danger by having the court approve and adopt the nonwaiver agreement in a court order.334 Furthermore, even when a non-

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Advisory Committee’s note on 2006 amendments).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. It has been held that:
many parties to document-intensive litigation enter into so-called ‘claw-back’
agreements that allow the parties to forego privilege review altogether in favor
of an agreement to return inadvertently produced privileged documents. The
parties here can still reach such an agreement with respect to the remaining seventy-two tapes and thereby avoid any cost of reviewing these tapes for privilege.
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
332. See Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md.
2005) (discussing danger of waiver even where parties enter “non-waiver agreement”).
333. See FED. R. EVID 502(e) (“An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a federal
proceeding [of a privileged document] is binding only on the parties to the agreement,
unless it is incorporated into a court order.”).
334. See id.
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waiver agreement or order is in place, a party should still take reasonable
measures to protect the privilege.335
• Information Governance Review
Each of the foregoing cost-reduction tools only applies after litigation begins. Prior to such point in time, the most powerful tool that a
company can use to reduce its exposure to e-discovery costs is effective
management of its ESI. Although a party can control cost by limiting the
scope of e-discovery or streamlining the production of ESI, the most effective way to reduce costs is to reduce the volume of ESI that could be
subjected to discovery. Because we can now store enormous quantities
of electronic information at low cost with a small physical footprint, we,
as a society, have developed a tendency of retaining far more information
than we actually need or use.336 As a result, a substantial portion of ediscovery cost is incurred wading through information that has no functional purpose or value either inside or outside of the litigation.
A company can eliminate the e-discovery risks associated with the
accumulation of valueless ESI by conducting a pre-litigation information
governance review to identify what ESI it is creating and storing, what
the ESI contains, where the ESI is stored, why it is storing the ESI (i.e.,
for regulatory, business, or other reasons), and what function that ESI
serves for its business. By using the results of such a review to craft a
comprehensive information governance plan that eliminates existing repositories of ESI that have no functional value, and prevents such repositories from forming in the future, companies can substantially reduce
the risk of runaway e-discovery costs once litigation begins. An information governance review of this type also allows companies to craft and
implement a litigation response protocol to ensure full compliance with
their preservation obligations and, thereby, reduce the threat of spoliation.
335. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 502 (Advisory Committee’s note) (“[A] party that uses advanced analytical software applications and linguistic tools in screening for privilege and
work product may be found to have taken ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent inadvertent disclosure. The implementation of an efficient system of records management before litigation may also be relevant.”).
336. See Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC,
No. 05 Civ. 9016 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4546, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (noting that we live in “an era where vast amounts of electronic information [are] available”);
Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of Electronic Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 9 (2006) (stating that “improvements in technology
make information storage easier and cheaper in an electronic form”).
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V. CONCLUSION
State court litigation in North Carolina is far too diverse and varied
for H.B. 380 to have a uniform effect across every type of case regardless
of subject matter. However, as the experience of the federal courts following adoption of the 2006 Amendments demonstrates, the rules-based
framework that the E-Discovery Committee proposed and the North
Carolina General Assembly passed to govern electronic discovery lays
the groundwork for a fundamental shift in the State court discovery
process away from the traditional adversarial paradigm and towards a
more cooperative and proportional future.
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